THE FRAN CO-GERMAN WAR. 
419 
territories of Luxemburg and Switzerland, either to advance into 
Rhenish Prussia or cross the upper Rhine. There was no valid reason 
for expecting a rapid mobilisation; though, from the existence of the 
eastern camps and garrisons, a part of the Imperial forces might be 
ready to take the field in a very short time. To counteract a possible 
invasion over the upper or lower Rhine, and at the same time re¬ 
serve the power of employing their numerically superior forces in an 
offensive effort, was the problem to be solved by the Prussian staff. 
In accordance with a pre-arranged plan, it was decided that three large 
armies should be assembled in the Palatinate. 
If the Emperor invaded the Rhenish provinces, he would encounter 
the whole of the German forces; if he crossed the upper Rhine, his line 
of communications and further advance would be seriously imperilled by 
the presence of powerful hostile bodies on his flank. To make full use 
of their railway sytem for rapid concentration, the French would pre¬ 
sumedly be obliged to assemble in two main groups at Metz and Strass- 
burg, with the Vosges separating them. In the Palatinate the Germans 
would stand on interior lines to masses thus formed, and be able to 
act against either or both simultaneously. If the Emperor massed his 
forces for a defensive effort, it was evident that Alsace would have to be 
evacuated, as the advance of the troops of the Confederation on both 
sides of the Vosges completely turned the first defensive line formed 
by that mountain chain. In this case a wheel to the right of the three 
armies would be necessary, preparatory to a general advance westward 
against the Imperial forces. 
But little danger was to be apprehended from the separation of the 
German forces by the Vosges. If the armies on either side of the 
mountains were defeated, they would fall back on their own troops; 
while the French forces, in case of disaster, acting from divergent bases, 
would naturally be driven away from one another. The sole remaining 
difficulty was as to whether the German armies could be concentrated 
beyond the Rhine in the Palatinate without encountering the risk of 
being beaten in detail by a rapid offensive movement of the French. 
The plan of campaign projected by the Emperor was to mass 150,000 French 
men at Metz, 100,000 at Strasburg, and 50,000 at Chalons as a reserve. plans ‘ 
The two first-mentioned fractions were to amalgamate, cross the Rhine 
at Maxau, force the southern German states into neutrality, and advance 
towards the Main to seek a general action with the Prussian forces. To 
carry out this idea it was obvious that the passage of the Rhine would 
have to be effected before the German armies were mobilised. Assuming 
this was possible, it is difficult to see how further successes were to 
be obtained. To force South Gerpiany into quiescence, and at the same 
time mask the line of Rhine fortresses, would absorb a large proportion 
of the invading troops. With a line of powerful fortified cities in rear, 
a large entrenched camp on the flank (Mainz), and a numerically 
superior army in front, the prospect of a successful advance to Berlin 
seems somewhat visionary. 
To carry out their preconceived plans, the armies of the two nations Concentra- 
were gradually assembled on the frontier. The order to mobilise the tl0n ‘ 
North German forces was issued on the evening of the 15th July, for 
