THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
421 
The difference between the two systems of concentration is strikingly 
apparent. Each German army corps, completely furnished with men, 
horses, and equipment, in its own local district, was forwarded to the 
front an effective unit of the army of which it was to compose a part. 
On the other hand, the French corps were actually mobilised on the 
frontier. 
Difficulties first arose about calling in the reserves, afterwards in 
their transport and equipment, and the events of each succeeding day 
accumulated evidence as to the state of insufficient preparation and 
the other evils inherent in the French system. The railways were 
blocked with trains of reservists unable to get forward, the regimental 
and corps transport was incomplete, horses had to be taken from the 
artillery to bring forward the necessary food supplies, and the actual 
necessaries of bread and meat were in many cases not forthcoming. 
In addition to the failure of the field administration, it was found that 
the fortresses were in a most defective condition. Around Metz, the 
detached forts were neither revetted nor armed, the depots for pro¬ 
visions had not been filled, nor any arrangements made for standing a 
siege. Strassburg and the minor fortresses fared but little better; 
armed with obsolete weapons, and deficient in men and stores, the 
energies of their Commandants were taxed to the uttermost. 
Veiled by a thin cordon of outposts, the Germans formed their armies 
on the bank of the Rhine, and pushed forward, strong, compact, united, 
to the frontier; while in front of them, sprinkled along the whole line, 
stood detached French corps, weak in men, deficient in equipment, and 
swayed to and fro by contradictory orders. 
Up to the 2nd August there was no serious fighting on either side, Commence- 
but on that date the Emperor determined to make a reconnaissance in Crnties. 
force towards Saarbriicken, with the left wing of the army. From lack 
of preparation, his plan was not carried out in its entirety, but resulted 
in an offensive movement of the 2nd Corps (Frossard) alone. Neither combat at 
the I. or II. German armies having yet received the orders to advance ^tcken, 
to the frontier, the defence of the town was left to a few outpost troops, 2nd Aug. 
who made a gallant stand but were naturally obliged to evacuate their 
position. The capture of Saarbriicken, to effect which an entire French 
army corps was deployed in battle order, was therefore but a trifling 
success. It is difficult to see what object was gained by this military 
demonstration, as no further offensive movement was made, and the 
French forces remained in quietude on the banks of the Saar. Great 
uncertainty as to the military situation appeared at this period to exist 
on the French side as to whether their strategy should be of an offensive 
or defensive character, and even at this early stage their movements 
seem regulated by those of their opponents. 
In the beginning of August, Marshal Macmahon, in obedience to 
orders from Head-Quarters, pushed forward his troops to northern 
Alsace, directing his main forces towards a chosen position at Froesch^ 
wilier and sending a division under General Douay to the ancient 
fortress of Weissemburg. Advance of 
On the German side, all ideas of defensive measures had been Q e e r ™ri 
abandoned, and the armies were gradually deploying into an east and army 
west line, preparatory to forcing the frontier. It was evident that the frontier. 
