422 
THE EEANCO-GEEMAN WAR. 
III. Army would have the arduous task of passing through the mountain 
roads of the lower Vosges, and eventually have to force the defiles of the 
main range. To allow sufficient time for this extra work; the army of the 
Crown Prince was put into motion on the 4th August; with orders to 
advance into Alsace; and the bulk of the army marched accordingly in 
Action at four columns to the Lauter stream; which formed the frontier line. On 
Weissem- ariav i n g a ^ Weissemburg, it was found that the town and a line of hills 
4th. Aug. sou tfi of it was held by the troops of Douay’s division; about 5000 in 
number. The old fortress was speedily captured; and a general frontal 
attack made on the defensive position held by the French General. 
The gradually advancing German forces reinforced the assaulting troops, 
and enabled a flank movement to be directed against the right of the 
French line. Completely outnumbered, after a stubborn and gallant 
resistance, the French gave way, and retired precipitately on their main 
body, then assembling in the neighbourhood of Worth. 
The baneful effect of the undue dissemination of forces is here pain¬ 
fully exemplified. The detachment of General Douay’s small division 
to the frontier must be looked on as a strategical error. If the German 
forces wefe making an inroad into Alsace, it was clear that 5000 men 
could not stop them; if, on the other hand, the French troops were em¬ 
ployed merely as an advanced post, their role should have been more 
clearly pointed out to them. 
Advance of On the evening of the 4th all contact with the enemy was lost, and the 
We’issenJ* next day, in rear of large bodies of reconnoitring cavalry, the III. Army 
Wdfth? advanced, prepared to concentrate for battle in either a southerly 
or westerly direction. Information was received on the 5th that the 
French were assembling in force in the neighbourhood of Worthy with 
the evident intention of disputing the passes of the Yosges, and orders 
were issued in consequence for a concentrated advance in that direction. 
On the French side confusion reigned supreme. Owing to the defective 
and tardy concentration, the original plan of campaign could not be 
carried out. Keduced to defensive measures by the threatening advance 
of the German forces, it was obvious that a general union of the dis¬ 
persed corps would be advisable. It was clearly impossible for the left 
wing of the army to advance through the Yosges and leave the I. and 
II. German Armies on its flank. If, however, the French right wing 
was to retire westward, the whole of Alsace would be given up without 
a general engagement—a proceeding likely to be received with little 
favour by the turbulent spirits in the capital. The independent com¬ 
mand of the right wing was accordingly bestowed on Macmahon, with 
the clear understanding that he should endeavour to make head against 
the invader. Telegraphing to the corps of De Failly at Bitsch, which 
had been placed under his orders, and hurrying up available troops 
from Strassburg, were the measures he adopted preparatory to taking 
up at Worth a tactically strong position, which defended, both directly 
and indirectly, the main passes through the mountains. 
W 5 rth° f ^e F renc k troops facing east (left wing retired), occupied a line 
Ft. 45,000 about 3 J miles in extent along the undulating, partly wooded, partly 
Or. 130,000 yine-cla-d spurs of the western Yosges. In front, within musketry 
range, was a valley of flat meadow land traversed by the Sauer—a 
stream fordable with difficulty in consequence of recent rains. The 
