THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
428 
range of heights on the eastern side of the valley afforded but little 
shelter to an advancing force, the right flank was open and could be 
swept with artillery fire, but the existence of wooded ravines rendered 
a refusal of the left necessary. A main chaussee , running at right 
angles to the defensive line, passed through the villages of Worth on 
the Sauer and Froesch wilier in rear of the centre of the position. 
On the morning of the 6th the leading troops of the III. Army came 6th Aug. 
in contact with the French outposts, and attacked impetuously. On 
neither side was it intended to fight a general action, but the serious 
engagement initiated by the German advanced guards rendered a with¬ 
drawal from the fight rather compromising. Up to mid-day isolated 
attacks attended with great loss wer£ made against the position, finally 
culminating in an artillery duel between the batteries of both armies. 
Supported by the concentrated fire of their massed artillery, and the 
hourly increasing numbers of their troops, the V. and XI. German 
Corps made a general advance against the French right and centre. The 
fire-swept low-lying meadows were traversed with heavy loss, and a 
footing gradually gained on the western side of the valley. The central 
attack made but slow progress, but ground was gradually gained in the 
Niederwald—a wood on the French right—and a portion of the Imperial 
troops were cut off and retreated in disorder towards Haguenau. The 
attacking line gradually converged towards Froeschwiller—the key of the 
position—the great superiority in numbers of the Germans leading to the 
gradual envelopment of the French flanks. Heroic attempts were made 
to change the fortunes of the day by charges of cavalry; but the nature of 
the ground was too unfavorable to admit of the slightest success. Over¬ 
matched in artillery and completely outnumbered, the French at last 
gave way, and fled to the rear in the greatest confusion. Some of the 
fugitives took the road to Bitsch, many made their way to Strassburg, 
but the bulk of the army retreated to Saverne, where they were even¬ 
tually reduced to a semblance of order. Owing to the impossibility of 
pushing unsupported cavalry through the mountain passes, and the rapid 
forced marches of Macmahon, all contact between the two armies was 
lost. The 7th was a day of rest for the German forces, with the 
exception of the Baden Division, which was sent off in the direction of 
Strassburg, which was summoned to surrender on the 9th August.* 
Suddenly given command of an army dispersed along the frontier 
from Bitsch to Strassburg, with an enemy of threefold strength within a 
day's march, the position of Macmahon was certainly unenviable. Ex¬ 
ception may, however, be fairly taken to his stand at Worth; though 
tactically strong, the position was strategically defective. For an inferior 
force to offer battle with a series of defiles in its rear cannot but lead to 
disaster in case of retreat, and to defend the passes of the Vosges in 
such a manner when they were practically turned by the advancing 
I. and II. German Armies seems injudicious. If from political causes 
it was necessary to fight east of the Vosges, it would appear that the 
retention of Strassburg as a base would give the opportunity of striking 
an offensive blow, on the flank of an army attempting to cross the moun- 
* The siege of Strassburg is 1 ‘eferred to subsequently. 
55 
