424 
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
tains, and at tlie same time secure a safe retreat. The non-appearance 
of De Failly's corps on the field has been the subject of much comment, 
arising as it did from the reception of contradictory orders from the 
Head-Quarters of each wing of the army. Although the defeated troops 
were much disorganised, it seems scarcely necessary for them to have 
taken such a circuitous route westward, or retreat so far. It has been 
suggested that a better course would have been to gain Metz by the left 
bank of the Moselle and join the forces of Bazaine, or retreat south¬ 
ward on Belfort. In the one case the union of the entire French army 
would be effected, in the other the presence of regular troops in the 
south would undoubtedly compel a division of the German forces, and 
possibly arrest the general advance. 
Advance of In the meantime, the I. and II. German Armies advanced side by 
n 6 German s ^ e to the frontier. Acquainted with the success of the III. Army and 
armies.^ suspecting a retreat of the French forces in their front, they pushed 
and 6th. forward their advanced guards towards Saarbriicken and the line of the 
Saar. It was intended that the main body of the II. Army should .pass 
through the town while the I. Army was utilising points of passage 
lower down the river. 
Battle of On the 6th August, General Frossard (the Commandant of the corps 
ig^that made the demonstration on the 2nd), withdrawing his outposts, took 
Gr. 67,000 up a position on the Spicheren-Steiring heights, opposite the town of 
Saarbriicken. Deceived by the apparent retreat of the French, and 
under the impression that a weak rear guard had alone to be dealt with, 
the leading German troops boldly crossed the river. A heavy fire of 
artillery, however, soon made it apparent that the nearly impregnable 
heights were held in force. In spite of great inferiority in numbers, a bold 
attack was made on both flanks of the position, but without success; and 
the small German force (a division), fought unsupported against the 
whole of Frossard’s corps for more than two hours. Gradually accruing 
reinforcements gave a new impetus to the attack, which became general 
along the whole line. The steep slopes of the plateau were gradually 
surmounted, in spite of the murderous fire of the Chassepot, and with 
incredible exertions twelve guns were eventually hauled up to the crest. 
As at Worth, a wood on the right of the French line was successfully 
utilised in the advance, and the superior direction of the German artil¬ 
lery plainly evinced. Against the Prussian position on the edge of the 
plateau, frontal attacks in force were repeatedly made. Disheartened 
by their want of success, and threatened on their left flank by newly 
arriving troops, the French gave way at nightfall and retreated in good 
order on Saargemund. 
It is not difficult to attribute to its true causes the double defeat 
suffered by the French on this day. Superiority in numbers and organisa¬ 
tion, combined with the advantage of takiug the offensive, were on the 
German side. The advance of their powerful armies on both sides of 
the Vosges, with their flanks covered by Luxemburg and the Bhine, was 
a safe operation; and though either wing might have received a check, a 
disaster was impossible. On the French side a defective administration 
nullified all the attempts to carry out the original plans of the Emperor. 
The disposition of the several corps seems, moreover, very injudicious, 
