THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
425 
and to violate tlie sound principle that inferior forces should be massed. 
Whether for offensive or defensive purposes, it was essential that the 
French troops should be concentrated ; and while effecting that object 
it was unsafe to place isolated corps, liable to defeat, so close to the 
frontier. Distributed, however, as they were, the lack of common recon¬ 
noitring precautions seems inexcusable. In the several engagements—• 
notably at Spicheren—the want of mutual co-operation of corps on the 
French side is especially remarkable, while the sound of firing apparently 
hurried all available German forces to the field of battle. This principle 
seems, however, to have been carried to excess at Worth, where the 
German outflanking* troops lost sight of their proper objective. 
After their defeats, the beaten armies retreated in an easterly direction Retreat of 
in two large masses. The greater portion of one of these bodies consisted Freneh * 
of the troops routed at Worth, whose retirement was compulsory and 
attended with disaster. The left wing, on the other hand, was composed 
of the main Imperial army, only one of whose corps had yet been in 
contact with the enemy. With their right wing utterly disorganised, 
and their main body threatened in front with superior numbers, it 
was obvious that all offensive action was impossible, and that imme¬ 
diate measures had to be taken to secure the defence of the country. 
To effectually utilise their inferior forces, it was necessary to unite 
the two separated portions (now bearing the names of the armies of 
Chalons and Metz). Owing to the disorganised state of Macmahon’s 
troops, it was hopeless to expect a concentration east of the Moselle, and 
a general retreat to that river was ordered. There was much dispute 
as to the best course to pursue—whether to retire direct on Chalons, and 
thereby unite the two armies; or to retreat on Metz with the main body, 
and endeavour to close in the right wing to it; or to take up a defensive 
position south of Metz, and dispute the passage of the Moselle. As a 
consequence, between the 6th and 12th of August, orders and counter¬ 
orders succeeded one another with lamentable rapidity; but eventually the 
retreat on Chalons was definitely decided on. The main body retired from 
the district of St. Avoid directly on Metz, the vicinity of which was 
reached on the 12th inst. The 6th Corps (originally a portion of the 
reserve), was hurried up to the fortress, and on the 13th an army of 
176,000 men was assembled under the detached forts lying to the east 
of Metz. Macmahon, in the meantime, was retreating via Luneville on 
Chalons, where he eventually* succeeded in collecting about 120,000 men, 
the greater portion of whom consisted of the 1st, 5th, and 7th Corps. 
While the two armies were in full retreat, strenuous efforts were made eth-i3th 
by the Government to increase the defensive power of the country. The Aug * 
Gardes Mobiles were called out throughout the whole of France, old 
soldiers were recalled to the ranks, the troops destined for the Baltic 
expedition (including marines), were hurried to the capital, and pro¬ 
visions laid in with the utmost despatch. 
Whether it was necessary to give up the whole of the country east of 
the Moselle without resistance is a matter for discussion, bat under the 
circumstances it was probably advisable. The defensive positions on 
the Nied were not suitable for an army so large as that of Bazaine, and 
* 21st August, 
