THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
426 
the co-operation of Macmahon could, moreover, scarcely be expected. 
At Frouard, however, on the Moselle, both armies might easily have 
been concentrated by the 13th, and the position would have been both 
strategically and tactically powerful. On the other hand, the fortress of 
Metz was in a most defenceless state, and urgent appeals were made to 
secure its safety by the detachment of a large force. By marching the 
troops of Bazaine through the town, time and opportunity would be 
given for strengthening the works and reinforcing the garrison of the 
virgin city. 
Advance of After their successes at Worth and Spicheren, the three German 
armS man armies occupied with their leading troops a south-easterly line passing 
through the two places, the III. Army (Crown Prince) being separated 
from the other two by the mountain chain of the Vosges. Owing to 
the hurried retreat of the French forces, contact was lost for the time; but 
it was naturally supposed that a serious stand would be made on the line 
of the Moselle. To effectually link the armies together and make a simul¬ 
taneous advance towards the retreating troops, it was necessary to make 
a strategical wheel to the right on the pivot of Saarbrlicken. To carry 
out this measure the I. Army (Steinmetz) had to remain halted, the 
II. (Prince Frederick Charles), gathering up its rearmost troops, had to 
push forward south to form the centre of the line, while the III. (Crown 
Prince), forming the outer flank, had to traverse the difficult defiles of the 
Vosges, and close in on to the left of the II. Army. The passes through 
the mountains which the Crown Prince had to utilise were closed by 
small forts, none of which proved a real obstacle with the exception 
8th Aug. of Bitsch and Phalsbourg.* Advancing in five different columns, the 
mountain range was crossed in two days, and union with the left of the 
II. Army effected on the line of the Saar. As soon as the wheel was 
completed, the three armies marched westward through Lorraine, linked 
together in one homogeneous body, with their front covered by a 
numerous cavalry, two days* march ahead. On the 12th August the 
Map 2 . positions marked in the map were reached, the right of the whole force 
resting on the Nied, the left somewhat withdrawn at Saarburg. 
i2tii-i4th The same evening the French Emperor, constrained by public opinion, 
' handed over the command to Bazaine, with definite instructions to retreat 
at once through Metz on Chalons. Numerous temporary bridges had 
been previously thrown across the Moselle, but were rendered useless 
for the most part on account of heavy floods. The whole of the 13th 
was occupied in arranging the details of a passage, which was not 
commenced till the following morning. The French troops were en¬ 
camped on the right bank of the river in a wide semicircle, within range 
14th Aug. of the detached forts. The cavalry patrols sent out in the morning did 
not report the presence of an enemy, and the retreat was leisurely 
begun from both flanks of the line of bivouacs. By 3 o'clock half the 
French forces had crossed the river. 
* Bitsch—a strong isolated fort—was invested bj Bavarian troops, and did not fall into German 
hands during the war. 
Phalsbourg, commanding the high road through the Vosges, was bombarded by the XI. Corps 
and eventually invested by Landwehr troops. The Commandant made a most gallant resistance 
with the small garrison at his disposal (1200 men), and held the fort up to the 12th December, 
when famine forced him to capitulate, 
