THE FRANCO-GEEMAN WAE. 
427 
In the meantime, the three German armies, steadily advancing, had 
reached with their advanced troops the vicinity of Metz and the general 
line of the Moselle. 
The General commanding the advanced guard of the VII. Corps (I. 
Army) arriving at Laquenay, saw the French troops gradually defiling 
to the rear. Aware that it was highly important that the French retreat 
should be delayed as much as possible, in view of the contingency that 
a flank attack might be made on the leading troops of the II. Army 
now crossing the Moselle, he determined to assault at once with the 
small force at his command (a brigade), informing at the time the com¬ 
manders of the corps nearest him (the I., VII., and IX.) of his intention. 
Covering the French retreat was the 3rd Corps (Decaen), deployed in 
two lines facing to the east on the heights above the village and valley 
of Colombey. These troops were in the act of retiring when attacked 
impetuously on their centre by the brigade Goltz. On the German 
side were advancing in support the leading troops of the I. and VII. Corps, 
on the outer flanks of which were two cavalry divisions. The gradual 
reinforcement of the fighting line eventually converted into a battle 
what was originally but a vanguard action. To meet the increasing hostile 
forces, a portion of the French 4th Corps (Ladmirault), which had 
crossed the river, was repassed to the right bank, and in coujunction 
with the troops of Decaen resisted the German advance with success. 
The Imperial Guard was available for offensive purposes, but was em¬ 
ployed solely as a reserve. As night closed neither side had given way, 
and in accordance with the orders of the morning the French retreat 
was continued, and the remainder of the army passed across the river 
under the protection of the detached forts. 
This battle—commenced at an hour at which engagements often ter¬ 
minate—may be cited as a successful example of an advanced guard 
action, where a small body of troops initiated a strategical victory by 
arresting the retreat of an army, maintaining at the same time, without 
retiring*, the forward position to which a bold attack had committed them. 
Victory has been claimed by both sides, and tactically it may fairly be 
considered to be a drawn fight. The strategical importance of the engage¬ 
ment was, however, clearly seen by the German Head-Quarters, as evinced 
by the order issued on the morning of the 15th:—The fruits of the victory 
(i.e. Borny) can only be gained by a vigorous offensive by the II. Army 
towards the Metz-Verdun Hoad (east of Metz) V The attack of General 
Goltz with his advanced guard brigade was certainly justified by its 
success, but it is an open question whether in case of failure it would not 
have incurred much hostile criticism. The conduct of Bazaine at this 
period has been much commented on. It has been urged that if he 
was bent on retreating, he should not have fought at all on the 14th, 
but let the guns of the Metz forts keep the enemy at a distance; or if he 
accepted battle, he should have taken a vigorous offensive against the 
inferior forces in his front. On the other hand, he has stated as his 
opinion that he was committed to a retreat, but that the outer detached 
forts were in such a defenceless state that they were liable to be taken 
by assault, and that therefore the onward pressure of the Germans had 
to be resisted up to a certain point. 
On the following day the march westward of the French was continued. 
Battle of 
Borny:— 
Er. 104,000 
Gr. 98,000 
15tli Ang. 
