THE ERANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
429 
the ground—the 5th and 6th Divisions of the III. Corps. An imme¬ 
diate advance was made by these troops, and the villages of Flavigny 
and Vionville captured with heavy loss. At noon the French, acting 
generally on the defensive, occupied the heights west of Rezonville with 
two corps facing westward. Bazaine, apprehensive of being cut off from 
Metz, kept his reserves on the Gravelotte plateau. The French right 
(3rd and 4th Corps) were moving southward towards the line of battle. 
It will be seen that one German corps, preceded by two cavalry divisions, 
had thus placed themselves across the road in front of the whole French 
army. At 2 p.m. the French 3rd Corps came into action, aud it was 
apparent that an advance was about to be made by the right of the 
French line. In order to effect delay, and give time for reinforcements 
to come up, a brigade of German cavalry was launched against the 
threatening troops, and their daring charge, in spite of enormous loss, 
effected its object. At 3 o'clock, the X. Corps arrived in time to rein¬ 
force the threatened German left, and about the same time the French 
right was increased by the addition of the 4th Corps. The line of battle, 
which formerly stood nearly west, now faced due south. A series of 
attacks with varying success were made by the newly arriving French 
troops, and finally led to a great cavalry engagement in the vicinity of 
Mars-la-Tour, for which both nations claim success. On the other side 
of the battle-field a desultory fight was kept up as long as daylight 
lasted. The losses of the contending forces were very heavy—amounting 
on each side to about 16,000 men. 
The true importance of this day cannot be judged of by its tactical 
results. The Prussians had certainly not been able to drive the French 
out of their main positions; but, on the other hand, the French had not 
been able to recover the ground lost before noon, nor re-continue their 
march. The victory, however, clearly lay with the Germans in a strategical 
point of view. By a bold employment of their numerically inferior forces 
they had stopped the French retreat, and given time for their main body 
to effectually interpose between the junction of the two Marshals. 
Much criticism has been expended on the unnecessary delay under the 
eastern forts of Metz, and the time occupied in crossing the Moselle. 
It is difficult to understand why the northern route by Briey was not 
utilised. Every moment was of consequence, and to endeavour to 
march the greater part of a large army by one road out of Metz could 
only lead to great loss of time. There appears to have been an idea 
that an attack would be made to the northward by troops crossing the 
Moselle lower down than Metz. At the same time, it was well known 
that the bulk of the II. Army was approaching the line of the Moselle 
above Metz, and common precaution might have suggested the destruc¬ 
tion of the permanent bridges at Ars and Pont-a-Mousson. Bazaine 
(who took over the command of the army on the evening of the 12th) 
did not apparently realise the necessity of a retreat westward, but was 
more inclined to rest on Metz as a base from which offensive operations 
might be directed. This view was perhaps not unnatural, particularly 
when the weak state of the detached forts was considered; but still it 
was against the spirit of the orders he had received, and militated against 
their being effectively carried out. The French forces were considerably 
inferior in numbers to those of their adversaries, and their best hope of 
