17th Aug. 
18th Aug., 
Battle of 
G-ravelotte 
Fr. 130,000 
Gr. 230,000 
480 * THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAli. 
success lay in a retreat for the purpose of combination. It is difficult 
to see why the fatal delay in marching off was permitted. Assuming 
that the previous loss of time was unavoidable, the reason for a further 
stoppage seems insufficient. The presence of the German cavalry was 
well known, and if an uninterrupted retreat was desirable, every moment 
was of value. Admitting that the 4th Corps was late in its appearance, 
this defeat might still have been partially obviated by directing it to act 
as a rear guard on the more direct southern road, while the Guard could 
have been shifted to the more northern chaussee. When committed 
to the engagement at Rezonville, why was a continuous defensive so 
sedulously maintained ? The German troops, if attacked with the vigour 
naturally in accord with the French spirit, during the morning must 
have been defeated. Even in the afternoon, when their reinforcements 
came up, they were numerically much inferior to the troops of the 
Marshal. The bulk of the German forces were in the act of crossing 
the Moselle, and a vigorous effort directed southward must have driven 
back their leading troops in confusion, and possibly allowed the army to 
pursue its retreat. A defensive line was, however, taken up instead, and 
the reserves kept on the left flank. Bazaine allows himself that he was 
afraid of being cut off from Metz; but that surely cannot be admitted 
as a valid plea. His orders were to retreat on Verdun, and in natural 
concurrence with this would be a departure from Metz. The fear of 
leaving the fortress which he avowedly shows, demonstrates how com¬ 
pletely he failed to realise the exigencies of the strategical situation. 
With regard to the bold attack of the III. German Corps, it may be 
fairly questioned—despite most of the German accounts—whether its 
commander was at all aware of his having the whole French army in 
front of him. Throughout the battle the Germans laid themselves open 
to be beaten in detail, and that they were not so must be attributed 
more to the inaction of the French Marshal than to any tactical com¬ 
bination of their own. 
On the night of the 16th both armies bivouacked on the field of 
battle, but at daybreak the French forces retired according to orders 
towards Metz—the retrograde movement being adopted ostensibly on 
the ground of want of ammunition and food supplies. The army even¬ 
tually took up a position on the continuous chain of heights to the 
east of and overlooking the Mause rivulet (extending from Rozerieulles 
to St. Privat la Montague). On the evening of the 16th orders were 
issued for the concentration of the II. Army on the battle-field. The 
III. and X. Corps, and a portion of the VIII. and IX. were already on 
the ground. There was little danger to be apprehended from a sortie 
from the fortress to the south or east, so the VII. and VIII. Corps of the 
I. Army were ordered to cross the river and form with the IX. the right 
of the bivouacked troops. The XII. Corps and Guards were directed 
northward to the left of the line in the neighbourhood of Mars-la-Tour. 
The I. Corps was left as a precautionary measure on the right bank of 
the river, and the II. Corps, which was somewhat in rear, hurried 
forward to Pont-a-Mousson. 
There was some uncertainty at the German Head-Quarters as to 
•.whether the French intended to attempt pursuing their retreat by a 
more northerly route, or offering a defensive battle under the forts of 
