THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
431 
Metz. Equally prepared for either contingency, the order was given for 
an advance in echelon of corps from the left in a northerly direction, the 
XII. Corps leading, followed by the Guards and IX. Corps, the X. and 
III. Corps following in 2nd line. The VIII. Corps was to move on the 
right rear of the IX., and the VII. still further to the right, forming the 
pivot in the case that a wheel to the right towards Metz should be 
necessary. 
The French position extended for 7 miles along the crest of an open Map 4. 
and broad ridge, the western slope of which mostly fell with a gentle 
declivity. The left wing was very strongly posted, owing to the nature 
of the ground and the protection afforded by the fort of St. Quentin 
and the Moselle valley. The right wing rested on no natural or artificial 
obstacle, and but few temporary arrangements were made for its protec¬ 
tion, owing to the absence of engineering tools. The reserve was posted 
in rear of the left wing. 
As the German echelonned corps marched northward, covered by their 
cavalry scouts, it soon became apparent that the French had delayed 
their retreat and taken up a defensive position resting on Metz. 
Orders were accordingly issued to move up into line in order to attack, 
it being intended that the two leading corps (the XII. and Guards) should 
envelope the French right flank. The simultaneous assault on the whole 
of the front line was prevented principally from a misconception as to 
the limit to which the French defensive position extended, and the 
battle was commenced at mid-day by the artillery of the IX. Corps. 
In order to afford support, the VII. and VIII. German Corps ad¬ 
vanced against the left of the French line, while the left wing of 
the II. Army continued its steady movement onward. The artillery of 
the Guards by 2 p.m. came into action on the left of the IX. Corps, its 
infantry advancing against St. Marie aux Chenes. At 5 o'clock the 
French army held intact its whole main position, after a frontal attack, 
chiefly of artillery, had been raging for five hours without intermission. 
Soon after this time an advance across the gently sloping glaces of 
St. Privat (the right of the French line) was made by the Prussian Guard, 
but was repulsed with heavy loss. The XII. Corps by 6.30 o'clock 
eventually carried out its flank movement, and commenced the attack 
of St. Privat from the north. A second advance—this time successful— 
was made at the same moment by the Prussian Guard, and the French 
right was thrown back in utter confusion, just as darkness set in. Early 
on the 19th the beaten French troops took up their bivouacs in a con¬ 
centrated position under the Metz forts. 
The objective of the two armies was at this period the same—an 
advance towards Paris—the French for the purpose of combination, 
the Germans to reach their natural goal, the Capital. If Bazaine could 
have left a sufficient garrison in the Metz forts and have resumed his 
march, the double advantage would have been gained of detaining a 
large investing force round the fortress and uniting the two French 
armies. Success depended on the factor of time; and how this element 
was on the one side frittered away in baneful hesitation, and on the 
other utilised to its fullest extent, is a study replete with interest. 
On the 18th August retreat westward was impossible, unless pre¬ 
ceded by a decided success, for the obtention of which it was obviously 
