432 
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. 
necessary that more than purely defensive measures should be taken. 
A defeat to the German forces might have been most disastrous, and it 
is a question whether Bazaine did not lose a valuable opportunity in 
not taking the offensive against the centre of the allied line. Whether 
it was expedient for the Germans to accept battle at all is somewhat 
doubtful. The interception of the French retreat was complete on the 
16th, and the French General could only resume his march by becoming 
the assailant and laying himself open to be attacked in flank. In lieu 
of taking up the Amanvillers position, it has been suggested that 
Bazaine might have passed his troops through Metz to the right bank 
of the Moselle on the 17th and taken the offensive in a south-easterly 
direction, pushing his army towards Strassburg and cutting the German 
communications. That this course was possible with a well-led army 
has been pretty generally admitted; but it is doubtful whether under 
the inferior direction that signalised the warfare round Metz any such 
attempt could have been successful. 
The position of the combatants in this battle is especially striking. 
Each army was facing towards its original base—the Prussians having 
their back to Paris, while the French faced towards it. As at Bezon- 
ville, the disposition of the French reserve seems very faulty, and to 
have arisen from an entire misconception of the value of the supporting 
fortress. If the Imperial Guard had been sent in time to the assistance 
of the right wing, it is very doubtful whether the turning movement 
of the Saxons would have resulted in success. 
The retreat of Bazaine having been effectually put a stop to, the 
next object of the German leaders was necessarily to make innocuous 
the flower of the French army, so recently beaten, while a rapid 
advance was made against the troops of Macmahon. Orders were 
accordingly issued by the King, on the morning of the 19th, detailing 
a certain number of corps (comprising the I. Army, and the II., III., 
IX., and X. Corps of the II. Army), for the duty of investing Metz ; 
while the Guards, IV., and XII. Corps were constituted into a 
IV. Army,* destined to operate with the already advancing III. Army 
against Chalons and Paris. A circle of investment about 32 miles in 
extent was formed outside effective range of the detached forts, and 
diligently strengthened by means of earthworks and obstacles. Owing 
to the heavy losses of the preceding days, the German corps were much 
reduced iu numbers, and the investing force may be estimated at from 
160 to 170,000 men—an effective the total of which was daily in¬ 
creasing, on account of the arrival of reinforcements. The army of 
Bazaine numbered about the same, inclusive of a large number of 
wounded and non-combatants. 
The III. Army, in the meantime, had advanced nearly to the Meuse 
(south of Toul), and was awaiting the issue of the engagements about 
Metz. On the 19th it received orders to continue its march westward, 
Aug. and on the 20th the main body, in four columns, protected by cavalry 
on the left flank, had crossed the river. MacmahoiPs troops, consisting 
of the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, were at this period at the camp of 
Chalons. 
* Called the army of the Meuse, 
