b.a.,1, pbxze essay, 1876. 485 
subject of our essay, inasmuch as a great part of the very newest 
teaching on the tactical employment of artillery is framed in accordance 
with, or breathes the same spirit as, that theory. The epitome of all its 
prescriptions runs very nearly :—“ Establish your superiority in artillery 
effect as early as possible, and keep it throughout” And proof is 
adduced to show that such a method of determining the course of the 
action must save the other arms from sensible losses. The subsidiary 
steps to be taken (passing by the constantly recurring recommendation 
to “ increase the field artillery”—patriotic enough, no doubt, but 
outside our present subject) towards this end are direct enough 
^Push forward all your artillery as far as you can, into action as 
early as you can; every individual gun not in position from the very 
beginning of the action represents, during its inaction, just so much 
of the means of victory unapplied.” And therefore “ Consider the 
whole of your artillery—corps as well as divisional—absolutely as 
advanced guard. Mass it at the very beginning, and so anticipate 
the enemy's developments of artillery. All the support needed at this 
period will be easily furnished by a few cavalry squadrons. Especially 
avoid that most mischievous fault of keeping any guns whatever as a 
reserve.”* 
Thus, whilst this advanced mass of artillery is shattering the disposi¬ 
tions of the enemy, and, as the critical points become more evident, 
concentrating its fire upon them, the other arms are to be brought up 
into the formations appropriate to the object of the action, secured 
from interruption, and, it may well be, even from observation, behind 
the screen of the artillery—which thus performs tactically, for the dis¬ 
positions of the other arms, the same office that the cavalry, in its 
newest and highest application, has discharged as “ the strategic veil ” 
for the armies. Few technical details are necessary to this simple 
system. To bring as many guns as possible into one long line (which 
maybe echelonned where the ground requires it), combining their action 
under one command, is the most urgent recommendation; to depend for 
escort on the continual arrival of the rest of the troops, and on an 
intimate tactical relation with them; to change position but rarely, but 
then effectively, and ever nearer to the object; to keep the ammunition 
columns well up and in effective communication with the fire-line for 
the supply of ammunition, men, and horses-—these are the principal 
remaining heads of the teaching generally deduced by this school from 
the last w T ar. 
There have, moreover, been included with the foregoing some maxims 
drawn from the earlier lessons of Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, 
Count von Waldersee, &c., to the effect that artillery—(1) having taken 
up an effective position, should stay there as long as its fire has good 
effect, altering its object and the elevation rather than its position ; 
(2) must never be withdrawn from a position on account of losses, if 
its fire would still be effective, as long as a man remains to work the 
* See Becker’s “Erfolge,” p. 24 efc seq.; Leurs’s “Artillerie de Campagne Prussieune,” p.95; 
Home’s “ Modern Tactics,” pp. 128, 132, 157, &c .; and most pamphlets and lectures of the newest 
school, at home and abroad, 
