440 
R.A.I. PRIZE ESSAY, 1876 . 
be, those dispositions, and to make itself ready, against the time of their 
completion, suddenly to combine its fire with that of its already engaged 
comrade in the form most suitable to the situation. Two such corres¬ 
ponding parts, having independence of movement but tactical connection, 
and attaining, between them, always to some employment of flanking 
or cross fire, could hardly fail (as far as the artillery engagement is 
concerned—and such is the staple of the commencement of modern 
battles) to put the long line, though of vastly superior force, irredeem¬ 
ably in the wrong. 
I used the expression “ at least two parts” in order not to preclude 
the possibility of having, in addition to the two larger tactical bodies, 
a small reserve, to provide for occasional needs—more particularly in 
defensive operations, I am not unmindful of the fact that the majority 
of the recent writings forbid the retention of any artillery at all for 
reserve, and support their injunctions for its ever-rnore-forward develop¬ 
ment by instancing how the larger part of the powerful French artillery 
reserve at Gravelotte never came into action at all, though the right of 
the position was simply crushed by the superiority of the German 
artillery concentrated upon it ;* but the instance simply shows that a 
reserve, like all other military means, should be utilised at the proper 
moment. Nor should the title of “ reserve” be any impediment to 
such use; as was well manifested in the same battle by that portion of 
the German artillery now entitled “ corps,” but at that time “ reserve,” 
which, however designated, was brought into equal action with that 
of its divisional precursors. Nor has anything been yet adduced to 
weaken the authority of that leading, most typical, and signal example 
of successful artillery disposition given to the world by Senarmont at 
the battle of Friedland. He divided his available 36 guns into two 
correlated parts of 15 guns each and a reserve of 6; and, carrying 
everything at his end of the field absolutely away before him, straight¬ 
way decided the battle, and achieved a greater success than has been 
claimed before or since for any artillery force of comparable magnitude. 
This scheme of employing the artillery concerned in each operation 
in two principal parts (their relative proportion to one another varying 
according to circumstances of ground, forwardness or cautiousness of 
the enemy, and ultimate object of the operation), may appear to depart 
too widely from the universally recognised maxim that guns should be 
massed for decisive effects; but the use of the term “ mass 99 appears 
to need re-consideration nowadays. In the Napoleonic times, when the 
word and the practice came in together, it was necessary, in order to 
bring the fire of a large number of guns to bear on one point, to plant 
them as near to one another as their principles of formation would 
allow: in fact, concentration of fire demanded concentration of guns. 
To-day, nothing of the sort is necessary, and the nearness of the 
artillery units to one another should be determined on other grounds—• 
such as the facilities of command and control and combination of fire, 
as also of conferring and comparing experience gained in the course of 
$ See Home’s ff Tactics/’- p. 132. 
