R.A.I. PRIZE ESSAY, 1876 . 
448 
should be attainable somewhat wide of, and retired from, one or both 
flanks of the infantry, as the outer flank of the guns may always be 
covered by the successively arriving artillery from the main body of 
the army. The time of opening fire will be, in the first case, whenever 
the guns will bear effectively, and it will be continued, if necessary, by 
their advancement in alternate parts; in the second case, when its own 
infantry is prepared for a forward demonstration; in the third, when 
the enemy is fully committed in his attack, and becomes exposed, at 
the most effective range, to a perhaps unexpected fire. In each of 
these three cases a certain amount of preliminary fire, to occupy the 
general attention of the enemy, is taken for granted, and the period 
specified is for the application of the utmost energy. Many combina¬ 
tions, of course, will occur amongst the three cases, and the scheme of 
artillery action will be regulated by the commander of the advanced 
guard, according to his purposes during the course of the engagement, 
until they become merged in those of the commander of the army. 
The artillery of the main body of an attaching force, having always for 
its principal object to facilitate the occupation by its own infantry of a 
portion (or thereafter the whole) of the enemy^s position, must now¬ 
adays be guided in accordance with three peculiar conditions arising out 
of the increased powers of musketry fire. It has come to be generally 
recognised that— 
First, infantry cannot possibly advance up to hostile equal infantry 
in position without extraneous assistance. The only effective, con¬ 
venient, and ever-ready method of affording such assistance is the 
application of artillery fire, to engage the enemy during the advance of 
the infantry, and to prepare the spot selected for its attack by levelling 
defences, and driving out, destroying, and disorganising the defenders. 
Second, infantry becomes so far loosened and disordered by the 
confusing nature of a closely contested musketry engagement, that the 
support of a steady artillery, established in position, is more than ever 
necessary for the protection, the encouragement, and, it may be, the 
rallying of the waving and intermittent lines of the battle. 
Third, so destructively decisive is modern fire, and so brief the 
periods during which it is possible for any troops to remain unbroken 
when fairly exposed to it, that affairs come to be decided at critical 
moments; and therefore the assistance of artillery fire, to be effective, 
must be essentially timely . If the action of the artillery be too slow, 
the decision will have been achieved without its co-operation, and 
thereby the next critical point demanding its action transferred, pos¬ 
sibly, to another part of the field. 
And it may be laid down generally, on the subject matter of these 
three considerations, that in proportion as the power of fire of every 
kind becomes developed, the more are decisive effects produced at 
peculiar instants, and the more does it become desirable for all the 
parts of a force to combine, as much as possible, their action at the 
decisive point and moment. Improved weapons lead absolutely to 
improved combinations of the three arms; and the necessity of an 
intimate acquaintance, of secure tactical connection, and of ready reel* 
procation of assistance, between therq is more urgent than ever. 
