444 
R.A.I. PRIZE ESSAY* 1876 . 
In the case now under consideration* the infantry attack is to be 
regarded as the object and practical outcome of the action of the artil¬ 
lery. The latter will take up positions* as soon as the general direction 
of the attack is decided on* and open fire principally upon the enemy's 
batteries* with some attention also to his posts* and works* and troops 
where visible. These positions will be generally as near to that of the 
enemy as the ground will admit of* consistently with a security from 
interruption and with the maintenance of a steady and carefully accurate 
fire; and though the features of the ground* and the dispositions of the 
enemy* and even the condition of the atmosphere* must very largely 
affect the choice of range* it is probable that a mean distance of one mile* 
with a margin either way of 4 or 500 yds.* will generally satisfy the con¬ 
ditions of this period. As the artillery of the defence is becoming 
quenched* the infantry of the attack will enter upon its advance* and 
its own artillery will begin to devote an ever-increasing attention to 
the infantry position of the defence. By the time that the skirmishing 
front of the infantry attack comes under the aimed musketry fire of the 
defence* as much of the artillery of the attack as the ground will allow 
must be already in its last and decisive positions* bearing directly on 
the actual point determined for the delivery of the assault* and on the 
collateral lines; enfilading where it is possible* regardless of losses* 
straining every nerve (at such short range that none of its efforts will 
be wasted) to overwhelm with its fire* to disorganise and quell the 
defenders—daring everything in the intention of bearing the infantry 
through the last arduous crisis* and of thus securing the success of the 
whole. 
This third (if we have previously reckoned a first reconnoitring and 
a second engaging) deciding position must be so near to the lines of 
the defence that their particulars and occupants may be clearly 
discriminated. A range of 1000 yds.* with a margin either way of 4 or 
500* according to ground and attitude of the enemy* will probably 
represent the average distance. 
It will hardly be necessary to notice here that new positions must be 
entered as rapidly as possible* generally by successive parts of the 
artillery force which is to be moved; nor that every effort* consistent 
with the avoidance of diffuseness and of loss of mutual support and 
combination of action* must be made to attain positions flanking those 
of the enemy. Such positions may be obtained* primarily* by extension 
of front and advances on either wing—measures generally much more 
within the competence of the attack than of the defence; secondarily* 
by the application* to those dispositions which the enemy may have 
adapted to the original attack* of a fresh force of artillery hitherto 
undeclared. A force so kept in hand for its opportunity* will indeed 
have failed to satisfy those arithmetical tacticians who require that each 
gun should be inflicting some loss on the enemy* from the commence¬ 
ment uninterruptedly to the end of the engagement; but it will be 
liable to exercise a decisive effect at the critical place and time.'* It 
# This view, though little in vogue of late, is in fair accordance with that maxim of Napoleon’s 
expressed in the “ Memoire de St. Helene ”:—“ Celui qui sait faire arriver subitement et a l’insu 
de l’ennemi sur un de ces points une masse d’artillerie est sur de l’emporter.” 
