THE EEANCO-GEEMAN WAE (PART II.) 
495 
by making a flank march between the III. German Army and the 
Belgian frontier, and incurring the risk of a simultaneous attack on 
front and flank. Taking the most favourable view, it might possibly 
lead to the corps of the Meuse Army being beaten in detail, and as 
a probable consequence enforce the raising of the Metz investment. 
The hazardous nature of such a movement, combined with the fact that 
in case of Bazaine breaking out southwards it would be perfectly futile, 
was fully apparent. The absence of authentic information as to the 
exact position in which the army of the Rhine was placed increased 
the difficulties of the situation, and Macmahon, to temporally escape 
his dilemma, determined on the medium course of marching on Rheims, 
to take up a position which would enable him to await the development 
of the enemy 5 s plans, and at the same time flank the direct approaches 
on Paris. 
On the 21st the march northward was commenced, the camp being 2 ist Aug. 
evacuated in such haste that large stores of food, forage, and clothing 
had to be burnt. On the morning of the 22nd a telegram from 
Bazaine, stating that he believed he could continue his retreat in a 
north-westerly direction through Montmedy, was received, and led to 
the cancelling of previously issued orders for retirement towards Paris.* 
Influenced by this despatch, and fortified by the unanimous opinion 
of the War Ministry, the Marshal started in column of corps on the 
morning of the 23rd in a north-easterly direction towards Dun and 
Stenay,f having previously warned Bazaine of his movement. J In 
consequence of the difficulties experienced in feeding the troops, it was 25th Aug. 
found necessary to approach the line of railway, and the whole of 
the 25th was occupied in rationing the army in their bivouacs at 
Y ouziers-Rethel. 
Whilst the I. and II. German Armies were taking part in the decisive Advance 
struggles before Metz, the III. Army was advancing slowly westward Meuse au 
on the capital. Its main body had crossed the Meuse on the 20th of Armies ‘ 
August, the three leading corps having reached the line of the Ornain. 
To co-operate with these troops, three army corps were—as before men- Part i. 
tioned—detached from the forces investing Bazaine, and formed what 
was called the Army of the Meuse, under the command of the Crown 
Prince of Saxony. The III. Army was obliged temporally to halt, to 
allow this new body—which started from the Gravelotte plateau on the 
19th—to come up into line. The entire German force destined for the 
advance on Paris was eventually, on the evening of the 22nd, in a line 
facing west extending from Etain to Gondrecourt (50 miles); the Meuse 
Army forming the right wing, and the cavalry on the left being pushed 
* This despatch, was dated 19th August, and written the morning after the battle of Gravelotte. 
It appears there was also a second telegram, couched in somewhat less hopeful language, dated the 
20th August, which Macmahon declares he did not receive. As a duplicate of this second message 
(which Col. Stoffel was accused of intercepting), did not strike the Parisian War Ministry as con¬ 
taining any additional information, it is difficult to conceive why so much importance has been 
attached to it. (Vide “ Proces Bazaine.” “ La depeche du Vingt Aout,” par Stoffel.) 
f The direct route through Verdun being already intercepted. 
% A duplicate of this despatch reached Metz on the 30th August, and led to the sortie towards 
hi oisseville the following day. 
