25th Aug. 
Map V. 
26th Aug. 
496 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (part II.) 
forward as far as the Marne Valley.* Aware that the French forces 
were in the vicinity of Chalons, the advance was continued on a broad 
front in a westerly direction. On the 24th the general line of Verdun- 
St. Dizier was reached; on the 25th that of Dombasle-Vitry, the 
cavalry of the right wing being pushed through the Argonnes to 
St. Menehould. 
Reviewing for the moment the position at this date, it will be seen 
that a French army of more than 100,000 men was moving eastward 
towards Montmedy, while the Prussian forces, two days* march to 
the south and unaware of the circumstance, were marching westward 
towards Paris. The first information the Germans received of the 
evacuation of the Chalons camp arrived late on the night of the 24th, 
in the form of a telegram, which stated that Macmahon had taken up a 
position at Rheims, and was about to relieve Bazaine. As the direct 
road to Metz was barred by the Meuse army, it was obvious that the 
only means of carrying out such a plan would entail a hazardous flank 
march in close proximity to the Belgian frontier. As this seemed a 
somewhat improbable course, the German leaders contented themselves 
with directing their general line of advance in a north-westerly direction 
towards Rheims. 
MacMahon, on the other hand, was on the 21st undoubtedly aware 
of the existence, numbers, and general situation of both the German 
armies. His flank march was made with a full knowledge of the 
danger incurred, and it was easily apparent that its only chance of 
success lay in extreme rapidity of execution. The delays at Rheims and 
Rethel had already imperilled the movement, and the further causes 
that led to the disaster of Sedan can be best traced by following the 
movements of both armies for the next few days. 
On the 26th, the French army wheeled leisurely to the right on the 
pivot of Vouziers, for the purpose of advancing in two main columns 
on the Beaumont and Buzancy roads. In the afternoon, the cavalry 
of the right column (7th Corps, under Douay) reported the presence 
of hostile troops at Grand Pre, and this corps, in consequence, formed 
up in battle order, somewhat unnecessarily, at Vouziers. 
Owing to information received late on the 25th as to the movements 
of Macmahon, provisional orders were issued to both German armies, 
depending on the reports to be brought in by reconnoitring cavalry. 
As a result, the Meuse Army, changing its front, moved northward in 
anticipation, and with its leading troops reached Varennes. The 
III. Army closed in their corps to their right flank, so as to be ready 
either to advance towards Rheims or follow the movement of the Saxon 
Crown Prince. Covering these changes of direction, the cavalry ex- 
Infantry; Cavalry. Guns. 
,* III. Army. 118,095 ... 19,567 ... 525 
Meuse or IV. Army .. 70,028 ... 16,247 ... 288 
Total . 188,123 ... 35,814 ... 813 
III. Army.—V., VI., XI., I. Bavarian, II. Bavarian Corps, Wurtemburg Division, and 2nd and 
4<th Cavalry Divisions. 
Meuse Army.—Guard, IV., XII. Corps, and 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. 
