THE FRANCO-GERMAN . WAR (PART II.) 
499 
Several courses were open now to the French commander—either to 
break out towards Carignan and Metz, retire on to Belgian soil, retreat 
towards Mezieres, or fight in the positions already taken up. Of these 
undoubtedly the retreat westward was most in favour, and it was con¬ 
sidered that plenty of time was still available for its execution. 
The 13th Corps, which had been forwarded from Paris under the 
command of General Vinoy, was assembling at this time at Mezi&res. 
The German armies continued their march northward, detaching two 
corps (XII. and Guard) to the right bank of the Meuse, in order to bar 
the space between that river and the frontier. On the evening of the 
31st the contending forces were facing one another with their advanced 
troops in immediate contact. The boldly conceived flank march of 
Macmahon had, owing to defective organisation, utterly failed, and his 
army now‘stood assembled in a curve round the small fortress of Sedan. 
Pressing it back against the neutral Belgian frontier, advanced the 
numerically superior German forces, deployed on a broad front. 
The position taken up by the French was tactically a strong one, 1 st Sept, 
and well calculated to ensure a stubborn defence. Its eastern boundary 
was formed by the valley of the Givonne, from the western heights of 
which effective fire could be maintained over any direct approach. Con¬ 
tinuous ranges of hills formed parallel lines of defence to the north-west, 
and the south and west were protected by the broad valley of the Meuse. 
The fortress of Sedan, commanded by the higher ground on the opposite 
side of the river, was but of little defensive value. Two corps over¬ 
looked the Givonne valley facing east, one corps (the 7th), faced north¬ 
west on the Illy plateau, the remaining 5th Corps, under De Failly, 
forming the reserve. In order to advance against the position from the 
west, a detour had to be made round the bend of the Meuse, through 
a single road presenting the characteristics of a defile. The country 
. lying to the north was hilly and intersected, but towards the east was 
practicable for large bodies of troops. 
In accordance with orders, the German forces moved forward to the Map vi. 
attack during the early morning of the 1st September. Three army 
corps moved from the eastward against the Givonne position, while two 
crossed the Meuse at Donchery and advanced towards the Sedan- 
Mezieres road. South of the fortress, on the opposite side of the river, 
one corps kept guard.* 
It will thus be evident that two distinct attacks were to take place— 
one on each flank of the French lines. No special orders appear to have 
been issued for this day by Macmahon, it being intended to give a rest 
to the troops, and eventually lead them either to Carignan or Mezieres, 
according to force of circumstances. 
The engagement commenced at an early hour in the morning by an Battle of 
attack of the I. Bavarian Corps on Bazeilles—the village, occupied by the Sedan * 
* Towards Givonne Valley.—Guard, XII., and I. Bavarian. 
Towards Sedan-Mezieres Road.—V. and XI. Corps. 
Watching southern exit.—II. Bavarian. 
In reserve.—IV. Corps, Wurtemburg Division, and four cavalry divisions. 
The VI. Corps and 6th Cavalry Division remained in rear near Vouziers, covering the left flank. 
