THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART II.) 
501 
Paris for the relief of Bazaine was undoubtedly bold in its conception, 
though difficult to defend on strategical grounds. To successfully evade 
the blow of the advancing German armies by a flank march, two con¬ 
ditions were necessary'—sufficient time to gain a fair start, and ample 
space to carryout the movement in. When the advance was made from 
Chalons, the most northern German corps was in the vicinity of Verdun, 
and a march had to be effected through the-narrow band of territory 
extending between that fortress and the neutral Belgian frontier. 
Assuming the greatest*expedition to have been used, it would have been 
impossible, under ordinary circumstances, to escape the notice of the 
cavalry of the Meuse Army, and contact between the contending forces 
would have taken place, in any case, more to the eastward in the vicinity 
of Montmedy, Etain, or Thionville. If an extensive territory had 
existed to the northward, it might have been possible to make a long 
detour and successfully aroid observation; but the limited zone for 
manoeuvring forbade the hope of any such advantage. To gain the 
requisite time on the enemy, it was necessary to draw him further away 
from Metz, either towards Paris or the south, or by a feint deceive him 
temporally as to the projected movement. As it happened, the German 
armies were in a central position, and were enabled to take advantage 
of the lesser space they had to traverse on the interior lines they 
occupied. In addition to the strategical difficulties of the situation, the 
Army of Chalons was not in that thoroughly prepared state to make it 
equal to the requirements demanded of it. In spite of these unfavourable 
circumstances, a partial success was at one time by no means impossible. 
On the 25th August the French army of over 100,000 men was on the 
flank of the German advance, and might, if expedition had been used, 
have beaten in detail the northern corps of the Meuse Army. Whether 
Metz could have been reached is a matter of opinion, but undoubtedly 
a well-timed sortie from Bazaine would have given an impulse towards 
success. To an army incapable from its nature of rapid manoeuvring, the 
safest movement was assuredly towards the fortified capital, where a 
prolonged stand might be counted on and an investment rendered nearly 
impossible. As, however, in the political situation this course was 
impolitic, it would seem that a retreat to the north-west through Rheims, 
drawing the German armies after it, would have been advisable. If a 
forward movement towards Metz was a necessity, it would have been 
safer to make a detour southward and endeavour to conceal the 
manoeuvre by a feint towards the northern Argonnes. Paris might 
have been left to defend itself (as it was afterwards compelled to do) 
with the nucleus of regular troops it possessed, and the further advance 
of the German forces been endangered by the position of a powerful 
field army on their flank. The deplorable slowness of the marching, 
and the insufficient scouting of the cavalry, that led to the surprises at 
Nouart and Beaumont have already been alluded to, and combined with 
the want of unanimity in direction, formed a series of secondary faults 
that conduced in no small measure to the ..disastrous capitulation. 
The unfortunate delay at Sedan on the 31st is not easy to understand. 
The retreat on Mezieres would have been practicable on the following 
day, according to Macmahon^s opinion; but it is inexplicable that (as a 
