502 
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART II.) 
precautionary measure) more care was not taken in destroying the per¬ 
manent bridges over the Meuse and scouting along the flank of the 
projected movement with cavalry. The successive changes in the 
supreme direction during the engagement undoubtedly influenced its 
result; but, at the same time, the order of battle was in itself defective, 
as it did not cover the line of retreat. 
It has been maintained that the German strategy was over cautious, and 
that a portion of their forces might have been, after the 25th of August, 
detached towards Paris. It is difficult, however/to see what advantage 
could have been gained. The French capital was too strongly fortified 
to have been taken by storm, and the great advantage of numerical 
superiority over the sole French army in the field would have been 
thrown away. With a portion of the Imperial army closely invested at 
Metz, and the remainder compelled to capitulate, no further obstacle 
opposed itself to an advance on Paris. Within an hour after the 
capitulation was signed, orders were issued for the march westward, 
the I. Bavarian and XI. Corps being left behind in charge of the pri¬ 
soners, for the conveyance of whom to Pont-a-Mousson and Etain 
arrangements were at once made. At these two places they were 
transferred to the charge of the troops investing Metz, and by them 
despatched for internment in Germany. 
March on The first measure to be effected was the opening out of the two armies 
Pans. f rom their closely concentrated position round Sedan. The order of 
march had been somewhat inverted, the lines of communication of 
several corps having crossed, and this inconvenient displacement had 
to be rectified. The III. Army started in a south-westerly direction 
to gain its former position on the left fiank, while the Saxon Crown 
Prince with slower marches advanced westward. By regulating the 
length of the stages the different corps regained their respective posi- 
15 th sept, tions in line, and on the 15th the whole force, preceded by four cavalry 
divisions, occupied a line 30 miles to the east of Paris, extending on 
both banks of the Marne from Villers-Cotterets to Rozoy-en-Brie. 
As a result of the catastrophe of Sedan, the French empire was 
overturned by a bloodless revolution on the 4th September, and a 
Provisional Government formed for the national defence, under the 
presidency of General Trochu. 
Investment Surrounded on two sides by a complex water-line, and on the re- 
of Pans. ma t n i H g circumference by a double rampart of hills, the natural defensive 
power of the capital was undoubtedly great. Exclusive of the inner 
bastioned line, the city was surrounded by a girdle of 16 detached forts 
of powerful type, which, however, possessed the disadvantage of being 
situated on the inner range of hills, too near the enceinte to fulfil modern 
requirements. Energetic measures had been taken, immediately after 
the outbreak of war, to complete the armament of the forts, and increase 
their power by the addition of naval guns of large calibre. Several 
outworks were designed for the outer range of hills, but as they were 
not finished in time for occupation these matchless positions had to be 
abandoned to the enemy. 
The troops available for defence were the 13th and 14th Corps* 
* The 13tli Corps had retreated from Mezieres after the battle of Sedan. The 14th Corps was 
composed of regiments hastily summoned from the provinces, gendarmes, foresters, &c. 
