THE FRANCO-HERMAN WAR (PART II.) 
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(about 70,000 men) ; destined in general for offensive enterprise. 
Behind these, in second line, to guard the forts and outworks, were a 
division of marines, 14,000 strong, and the “ Gardes Mobiles”—a semi- 
disciplined force of about 100,000 men. For manning the enceinte 
and maintaining order in the city, recourse was had to the “ National 
Guard”—an undisciplined mass of doubtful value, but amounting to 
300,000 men. The armament consisted of about 3,000 guns of various 
types, of which 500 could be employed for field service. 
Orders for the investment were issued from the German head-quarters 
on the 15th of September. The Meuse Army was directed to occupy 
with its three corps* the northern side, in a line extending from the 
right bank of the Marne to the right bank of the Seine—an operation 
successfully completed on the 19th inst. The III. Army completed the 19th Se P 4 
investment on the southern side the same‘evening, in spite of a vigorous 
attack made by General Ducrot near Chatillon. The two armies were 
preceded by three cavalry divisions,! who rapidly seized'all the main 
approaches and forestalled the work of their slower-marching comrades. 
Owing to the impossibility of filling up the casualties which had so 
recently occurred, the German corps were much under strength, and 
their entire force did not amount to more than 147,000 men with 622 
guns. With such a comparatively small effective the operation was 
undoubtedly hazardous, and it is difficult to understand why more resist¬ 
ance was not made to it. The troops which attacked under Ducrot 
did not amount to more than 28,000 men. Allowing that a large portion 
of the defending force was not available for field operations, this seems 
but a meagre per-centage. to be drawn from a body of 500,000 armed 
men, and Trochu himself admits that a larger number might have been 
employed. 
When once invested, the question remained as to the manner in which 
the reduction had to be carried out. To trust to the gradual effects of 
a blockade and allow hunger to do its work, attack in a regular manner 
one of the sides, destroy the forts by artillery, or bombard the town, were 
measures open to discussion. The decision rested mainly on two points— 
the means of resistance possessed by the besieged, and the weapons of 
offence procurable by the investing troops. It was assumed that the 
defending force would naturally increase daily in efficiency, and eventually 
be available for powerful offensive sorties. No certain data could be 
arrived at with regard to the supply of food, but the best informed 
estimated that with the most rigid economy provisions might last for 
10 weeks. As regards the investing force, it was evident that more 
troops were necessary to maintain a strict blockade; the corps would 
have to be filled up to their full strength, and the immediate presence 
of the I. Bavarian and XI. Corps from Sedan was most desirable. Before 
commencing an attack, whether by artillery or otherwise, it would be 
necessary to procure a siege train, which would have to be forwarded 
from the Bliine. This, however, could not be effected till after the cap- 
* IV., XII., and Guard. 
f The remaining cavalry division was detached towards the Loire, to report on the levies in 
process of being raised there. 
