i'HE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART II.) 
505 
disorder. The repulse on this day produced a great moral effect on the 
city, from the fact that many of its inhabitants were personally engaged, 
and no sorties were attempted for a long time afterwards. 
In considering the operations round the city up to this date (the end 
of October), it will be noticed that all the sorties were made by com¬ 
paratively small forces, never exceeding 30,000 men. The several 
combats were always preceded by a cannonade from the forts in 
the vicinity of the points of exit—a mode of operation which seems 
inadvisable, as it at once put the enemy on his guard. On the German 
side, the difficulty of provisioning the troops was lessened on . the 23rd 
September by the fall of Toul, which enabled a line of rail from Germany 
to be opened to within a few miles of Paris, and siege equipment to be 
rapidly forwarded. On the 27th the fall of Strassburg released its 
investing force, and at the end of October the capture of Metz rendered 
available the bulk of the I. and II. Armies. The investing force at 
the end of the month amounted to about 236,000 men with 900 guns, 
a portion of whom were occupied in the protection of the blockade 
from the newly raised levies of the provinces—an aspect of the cam¬ 
paign which will be alluded to further on. (Vide Part III.) 
Turning to the eastern theatre of war, it will be remembered that 
after the battle of Worth the Baden Division was detached to the south, 
to observe the important fortress of Strassburg. At the time of investment 
investment the garrison consisted of about 17,000 men, of whom hm-gTSth 
9,000 were regular troops—principally refugees from Worth. The for- August - 
tifications were chiefly of ancient date, there were no detached works, 
and bomb-proof cover was very deficient. The chief strength of the 
fortress lay in its inundations, which made an attack impossible except 
on the north-west front. No opposition was made to the investment, 
and but two sorties of slight importance attempted. A heavy fire of 
field guns was at first directed against the Citadel and outworks, and 
effected some damage among the ‘civil population, in retaliation for 
which a good deal of injury was inflicted on the open town of Kehl by 
the French. On the 19th of August the siege park* began to arrive, 
and the blockading* troops were reinforced by the Guard Landwehr 
and 1st Reserve Divisions. On the 24th a bombardment of the town 
commenced, and after lasting three days was put a stop to on sentimental 
grounds. Recourse was now had to the regular siege operations, and a 
first parallel was opened on the night of the 29th. The attack was 
pushed forward with vigour, encountering but a feeble resistance, and 
the descent of the main ditch was commenced on the night of the 
26th September. The garrison was not in a position to stand an assault, 
and the place surrendered on the 27th, the garrison (17,000 men)becoming Fail of 
prisoners of war, and a very considerable materiel falling into the hands ^^septf’ 
of the victors. A small garrison from the investing force was left in 
the town, the Guard Landwehr Division was forwarded to Paris, and 
the remainder of the troops formed into a new corps (XIV.), destined 
for operations further south. 
It will now be necessary to return to the consideration of the invest- 
---'-- 20tli Aug\ 
* 200 rilled guns, 88 mortars, and 50 wall pieces. 
65 
