506 
THE ERANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART II.) 
Part i. ment of Metz. It will be remembered that on the evening of the 
18th August (the day of the battle of Gravelotte) the 6th Corps, under 
Canrobert, which occupied the right of the French defensive position 
at St. Privat, was defeated, and retired in disorder. Orders were 
issued at nightfall and carried out early the following morning for a 
general retirement of the whole French army to the vicinity of the 
detached forts. The 2nd and 3rd Corps occupied the ground on the 
right bank of the river, facing south and east ; the 4th and 6th Corps, 
with the Guard in reserve, took post on the left bank, facing the west 
and north. Strong lines of entrenchment were thrown up connecting 
the several forts, and the villages in their immediate vicinity placed in 
a state of defence and occupied by outposts. On the 22nd all losses 
sustained in the previous battles had been made good, and the troops 
provided with their full complement of ammunition and warlike stores. 
The precaution of amassing large quantities of provisions in the city 
had not been taken till too late, and the supply of food was insufficient 
for the requirements of a large army in addition to the civil population 
and the many refugees that had been incautiously admitted into the 
town. The period for which the rations would suffice depended entirely 
on the action taken by the field army, and the possibility of its pro¬ 
curing food by sorties. 
Map 7 . The German corps bivouacked in the positions they had attained on the 
eve of Gravelotte, and pushed forward the next day to an average distance 
of two miles in front of the detached forts. The line of investment 
was strengthened by field works; tetes-du-pont were formed above and 
below the city, and two principal magazines of supply created at Remilly 
and Pont-a-Mousson. Deducting the troops of the newly formed Meuse 
Army, there were available for the blockade the entire I. Army (I., VII., 
and VIII. Corps), four corps of the II. Army (II., III., IV., and X. Corps), 
and one reserve division. The ulterior object of Bazaine being a march 
westward, the main bulk of the forces were kept on the left bank, the 
right being guarded only by the I. Corps and Kummer’s Reserve Division, 
The following general principles were laid down for the guidance of the 
German generals :—Sorties to the north and south were to be opposed 
in front by the corps holding the bridges, and attacked in flank by all 
available troops. Any attempt westward was to be resisted energetically 
by all the troops on the left bank, while a trouee in mass to the east, if 
pushed vigorously, might be allowed to succeed. 
Bazaine, on the 18th, had announced by telegram to the Emperor his 
intention of re-continuing his march westward by the more northerly 
routes of Briey or Thionville, and received three days later a despatch 
from Macmahon stating that the latter was coming to his assistance. 
He determined accordingly to facilitate the march of the Army of 
Chalons by drawing the bulk of the German forces to the right bank of 
the river. If the projected sortie eastward was favourable, he would be 
enabled to profit by it by taking ground towards Thionville. With 
this view, the greater portion of the French forces were passed to the 
right bank of the Moselle on the 26th, and formed up between the forts 
of St. Julien and Queuleu. Owing to the insufficient bridging of the 
river, the encumberment of the roads with baggage, and the heavy rains^ 
