THE ERANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART II.) 507 
the operation was not completed till the afternoon. A council of war 
then decided not to continue the movement, and the troops were 
ordered back to their former cantonments. After the reception of 
another despatch from Macmahon, stating that he was marching 
towards Mont me dy and would be on the Meuse on the 27th, it was 
decided that the projected sortie of the 26th should be again attempted 
on the 31st of August. 
Owing to the usual defective staff arrangements, the march of the troops Battle of 
was unnecessarily delayed, and it was not till 4 o'clock p.m. that the order 
for advancing to the attack was given. The 3rd, 4th, and 6th Corps Gr> 74>00 ° 
were in front line, the 2nd Corps and Guard being in reserve. The 
main object of Bazaine was to get possession of the Plateau of St. Barbe, 
which commanded the surrounding country, and would, if held, protect 
the right flank of his further advance towards Thionville. To guard Map 7. 
the line of investment on the east bank of the river were the I. German 
Army Corps, one reserve division, and one brigade of the VII. Corps, 
amounting in all to about 45,000 men—less than half the strength of the 
attacking troops. During the afternoon, the Germans were further 
reinforced by the detachment of one division of the IX. Corps to the 
right bank of the river at Antilly. The battle was commenced by 
a vigorous cannonade, under the support of which the 3rd Corps 
successively gained possession of the villages of Noisseville and Montoy. 
With the assistance of the 4th Corps on their left, Servigny was taken 
at nightfall after a gallant resistance, the French left gaining ground 
as far as Chieulles and Vany. The French had thus succeeded in 
gaining possession of the outer investing line, but the movement was 
not followed up by the advance of the reserves, and Ser vigny was, about 
10 o'clock, recaptured by a night attack. 
Early on the 1st September the German forces, strengthened by the 1 st Sept, 
remainder of the IX. Corps, and supported by the closing in to the left 
bank of the river of the III. and X. Corps, proceeded to retake their 
lost positions. A severe engagement, attended with varying success, 
was initiated against the French left, while their right flank was pushed 
back with vigour. The main losses were incurred, however, in the centre, 
in the endeavour to regain Xoisseville, the capture of which village at 
11.30 o'clock led to a general retreat within the detached forts. It 
appears tolerably clear that Bazaine, on the 31st, had determined to 
force his way to Thionville by the routes through Kedange and Malroy, 
but that owing to the resistance he encountered he reverted that evening 
4o the original plan of the council of Grimont of retiring within the 
fortress. This accounts to some extent for the non-advancement of the 
reserves into line on either day. According to his own statement, the 
tardiness in attacking arose from a wish that as many of the German 
corps as possible should be drawn to the right bank, both with, the 
view of facilitating Macmahon's movements and lessening the danger of 
attack on his own left while advancing to Thionville. How to reconcile 
these views with the original intention of piercing the line of investment 
is not easy. It may, at all events, be fairly concluded that the battle 
was waged throughout with no one definite object, and, like all half 
measures, was not likely to be attended with success. 
