Capitula¬ 
tion of 
Metz, 
27th Oct, 
508 THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR, (PART IT.) 
In consequence of the 'ineffective sortie of the 31st and the simul¬ 
taneous defeat of Macmahon^s troops at Beaumont, it became evident 
that any future attempt to gain the open field would be made in a 
southerly direction. The investing corps on the south and south-east 
were accordingly reinforced and strongly entrenched—the newly arriving 
XIII. Corps being placed so as to cover the road Metz-Soigne-Strassburg, 
and arrangements being made for the transfer, if necessary, of the bulk 
of the army to the right bank. Three weeks passed in absolute inaction 
within the fortress. After the 4th of September, a distribution of horse¬ 
flesh was substituted for the ordinary ration, and it became evident that a 
passive resistance could not long be prolonged. With a view, apparently, 
of securing* what scanty supplies there might be in the vicinity, sorties 
were made towards Mercy-le-Hant, Colombey, Servigny, and Chieulles, 
from the 22nd to the 27th of the month. In proportion as the blockade 
continued, the chances of breaking out grew less. The energy and 
fitness for work of the French troops was much impaired, the horses 
of their mounted corps were diminished in number, and the investing 
works around the fortress were increasing daily in strength. By the 
end of the month Strassburg and Toul had fallen, and it appeared, in 
consequence, probable that any future sortie would be directed towards 
the Luxemburg frontier. The north-eastern portion of the line of 
investment \Vas accordingly strengthened by the passage over the river 
of the X. Corps. A sortie was made towards Ladonchamps on the 
2nd October, and repeated in considerable force on the 7th, but there 
does not appear in this instance to have been any intention of breaking 
through the blockading lines. 
As a result of a council of war, held on the 10th inst., it was decided 
that efforts should be made to gain honourable terms of surrender from 
tlie enemy, and if unacceptable conditions were imposed, to make a final 
desperate effort to escape. Owing to the fall of the Empire, and the 
absence of any stable Government in the country, negotiations as to 
the terms of peace were carried on for some days. Defeated in the 
open, then invested, and driven back in every attempt to break through, 
the French army had at last to accept the unwelcome conditions offered 
it, there being no choice between surrender and starvation. By the 
terms of the capitulation, signed on the 27th October, the whole army 
of the Rhine, 173,000 strong, became prisoners of war, and the fortress 
of Metz, with all its stores and materiel , delivered over into the hands of 
the conqueror. 
The investment of an army of 170,000 men in a powerful entrenched 
camp by a force but little stronger than itself, seems a matter requiring 
some. explanation. With 140,000 men available to take the field from 
a central position against a line of investment 33 miles in extent, it was 
obvious that numerical superiority at any one point could always be 
gained. Till recently it has been generally admitted that a large 
entrenched camp, protected by permanent detached forts and possessed 
of a powerful field army, can only be invested with difficulty by a force 
at least three times the strength of the garrison. Modern conditions 
of warfare have, however, modified these views; chiefly from the great 
defensive power of the present fire-arms, when combined with earth 
