THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR (PART IT.) 
509 
entrenchments, and the facilities for massing troops afforded by tele¬ 
graphs and railways. When the ground is favourable for investment, 
it seems possible to blockade an army with a force less then double its 
strength, provided sufficient time is allowed to throw up effective lines 
of circumvallation. On the other hand, it appears that the vicinity of 
these powerful camps is, instead of a protection, a great danger to the 
large armies of the day, whether used as a base or as a tactical support. 
If of necessity an army is driven within the detached forts, it would 
seem that its proper object should be so to use its central position as 
to render the complete investment impossible—in other words, to wage 
a series of offensive battles at the first commencement of the blockade. 
By holding the ground gained in each effort till the mass of investing 
troops came to the attack, and then taking the offensive against 
another portion of the investing circle on the interior lines naturally 
possessed by the besieged, a blockade by any but very superior forces 
would be rendered very difficult. If, however, in lieu of an army, an 
entrenched camp has, besides its regular garrison, an effective field 
force of 30,000 or 40,000 men, it will be apparent that the place, if 
near any hostile lines of communication, will have to be invested, and 
that the blockade must, on account of the ground to be covered, be 
carried out by a very large force. According to these views, Bazaine, 
when once within the detached forts, had two courses open to him— 
either to pierce the lines of investment and gain the open country 
(leaving a powerful garrison within the fortress), or to take such 
vigorous offensive measures immediately after the 18th August as to 
prevent the effectual closing of the blockading lines. The battle of 
Noisseville appears the only serious effort that was undertaken; but 
the successes gained in it were not followed up, nor his superiority in 
numbers utilised. Whether the intended sortie towards Thionville was 
judicious, is a matter of opinion. If that fortress had been gained, it is 
undoubted that the army of investment would have followed him, and 
forced him to give battle in a position critically near the Luxemburg 
frontier. The most feasible quarter for a sortie seems to have been to 
the south and south-east; and that an effort in these directions could 
not have been stopped—at all events at the commencement of the 
investment—seems evident enough from the perusal of the German 
orders. What would have been the ultimate fate of the escaped army 
it is difficult to state; but assuming the worst, its capture would not 
have entailed the loss of the Metz forts. 
The charge of treason made against Bazaine has scarcely been proved; 
but, at the same time, it cannot be denied that his despatch to Macmahon 
was most misleading, and conveyed an idea he had little intention of 
following out. The whole tenor of his conduct in the defective arrange¬ 
ments made for passing from one bank of the river to the other, the 
delibemte concealment for a week of his knowledge of the movements 
of the Army of Chalons, and the deceptive statements about lack of 
warlike stores, led inevitably to the conclusion that he had at no time 
any strong desire to quit the vicinity of the detached forts. Whether 
this tendency to immobility resulted from any political plan for personal 
aggrandisement, or was merely the natural consequence of fearing to 
