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THE ERANCO-SERMAN WAR (PART II.) 
31st Oct. 
lose by defeat an already acquired military reputation, is a matter for 
dispute. It is surely unnecessary to impute the disgraceful charge of 
betraying his country to the well-known French Marshal. A man by 
nature confident ; paralysed by the untoward course of events; unable to 
cope with surrounding difficulties ; unwilling to admit, even to himself, 
his incapacity; might take refuge with careless insouciance in the policy 
of remaining quiet till fortune again smiled upon him. The con¬ 
sequences were, however, most disastrous. Macmahon would undoubtedly 
have not undertaken his perilous flank march unless he had been 
assured of the co-operation of the Metz Army. Even, however, if a 
union had been effected to the north of the Argonnes, the position 
would still have been most critical, considering the nature of the 
country and the close proximity of the Belgian frontier. 
The news of the surrender of the whole Army of the Rhine spread 
consternation throughout the country. With the capital invested, and 
the entire regular army made prisoners of war, the situation appeared 
desperate. The Provisional Government, which had taken up its head¬ 
quarters at Tours in the middle of September, had, with a view of 
exciting the spirit of the nation, painted the situation of Bazaine in most 
glowing colours, and the utter collapse of their imaginative hopes was 
the more painful. Futile endeavours to obtain peace were made at the 
end of October, but the pride of the French nation was not sufficiently 
humbled to allow the acceptance of the unwelcome conditions offered, and 
a stern spirit of resistance to the bitter end was engendered throughout 
the provinces. The entire north-east of France was (with the ex¬ 
ception of a few fortresses) at this period in the hands of the invader, 
and his whole attention was naturally directed towards the capture of 
Paris and the repulsion of any efforts to effect its relief. Reviewing 
the situation for the moment, it will be noticed that the German armies, 
sweeping over a broad zone of country, had gained the centre of France. 
From the enormous mass of men brought into the field, it is apparent 
that the regions they passed through must have been speedily denuded 
of provisions, and that, from the hostility of the unconquered provinces, 
it was incumbent to fall back for supplies on the father country. To 
meet this contingency a general Etappen Inspection was appointed to 
each of the armies at the commencement of the campaign, the principal 
duties of which were the maintenance in good order of all the lines of 
communication, the collecting and forwarding of supplies, and the 
removal of sick and wounded to the rear. 
As the armies advanced, large magazines were formed at the principal 
stations of importance along the lines of railway. These again were, for 
convenience of issue, connected with smaller depots, the most advanced 
of which were one day^s march in rear of the troops. The available 
resources of the country passed through were collected at these several 
points, and from them transferred by a regular chain of civilian and 
military transport to the troops themselves. As the armies advanced 
westward, and the regions traversed became exhausted, recourse had to 
be made to Germany to forward the requisite supplies. A consideration 
of these facts will make apparent the prominent part played by railways 
in this campaign, and show how very dependent the various military 
