THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
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grasp, of suppressing changes in field artillery which they could not 
comprehend. The king's military talents and acquirements were far in 
advance of his cotemporaries, and his reforms were proportionally above 
and beyond their ken. 1 His attempt to introduce admirable, but radical, 
reforms into the artillery not only failed, but produced a reaction which left 
the received opinions stronger than ever, and rendered hopeless for the 
moment any effort to improve the mobility of the arm; for artillerymen 
were not educated up to the king's standard, and no reform can produce 
real and permanent good in any society unless it be the work of public 
opinion, and unless the members of the society itself take the initiative. 2 
While forty days in the year was the longest period for which a feudal 
chief could claim the military services of his retainers, 3 long wars and 
permanent forces were alike impossible. In the revolution of time, however, 
feudal obligations became gradually relaxed and nugatory, and, like other 
rules, the rule of military service fell into disuse. The formation of standing 
armies, which the decline and fall of feudalism thus rendered possible, the 
rise and progress of fire-arms rendered necessary. 4 The bow, or sword, 
which under the old system every man possessed, were simple and inexpensive 
weapons, and their use was mastered without loss of either time or money. 
The arms of the new system were cannon, the musket, and the pistol, which were 
costly and difficult to manage. There arose, too, as time rolled on, mortars, 
howitzers, and the like; and these things made it necessary to set apart and 
train up bodies of men for the sole purpose of war, and to separate them as 
much as possible from those other employments in which hitherto all soldiers 
were engaged. There were other influences, no doubt, which tended to 
produce the same result, but the use of gunpowder was the most effectual; 
because, by increasing the difficulty 5 and expense of war, it made a separate 
military profession indispensable. Thus it was that there arose standing 
armies. The first of these was formed in the middle of the 14th century, 
immediately after the invention of cannon; 6 but they did not come into 
general use until the 17th century, nor was it until the 18th century that 
they began to influence to any extent the fortunes of the artillery. During 
the latter part of the 17th century (and, indeed, long afterwards), this service 
was looked on as something quite separate and distinct from the army proper, 
and the rise and progress of standing armies affected directly neither its 
efficacy of fire nor its mobility. But while the artillery slumbered on in an 
undisturbed repose, isolated, and unchanging, the efficiency of cavalry and 
infantry uninterruptedly advanced, in proportion to the superior steadiness 
and cohesion of the permanent forces. The artillery, therefore, by standing 
1 Sir E. Cast’s “Warriors of the Thirty Years’ War,” Vol. I. p. 219. 
2 Buckle’s “Hist, of Civilisation,” Yol. IY. p. 132, 
8 Hallam’s “ Middle Ages,” Yol. I. p. 262. 
4 Buckle’s “ Hist, of Civilisation,” Yol. I. p. 190. 
5 “ The art of war, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it 
necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them.”—Adam Smith’s “ Wealth of 
Nations,” Bk. Y. ch. 1, p. 314. “Through the mere necessity of self-preservation war becomes 
continually, and must become, more intellectual.”—De Quincy’s Works, Vol. IY. p. 218. 
6 Blackstone’s “Commentaries,” Vol. I. p. 413. “(Euvres de Turgot,” Yol. VIII. p. 228. 
Quoted in Buckle’s “ Hist, of Civilisation,” Yol. I. p. 190. 
