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of their existence, but left a gap in the line, 1 2 which, as they were generally 
placed in the centre of the battalion, 3 might produce fatal consequences. 
Thirdly, as it was necessary for them to take part in all the manoeuvres of 
their battalion, the necessary time was not afforded to the gunners for placing, 
loading, or laying their guns carefully. 3 No guns could have been effective 
under this system, which violated both the fundamental principles of field 
artillery tactics—namely, that the movements of a battery in action should be 
minimum in number, and should be made at a maximum speed. Fourthly, 
their constant presence with their infantry led the latter to look upon the guns 
as necessary to the safety of the battalion, 4 and thus diminished that self- 
confidence which infantry must possess to be successful. Fifthly, as these 
guns were practically useless, not only was the money spent on their 
construction wasted, but the regular columns or trains of artillery were 
deprived of a corresponding number of guns, which might have been turned 
to good account by their own officers. 5 In fine, this bad system weakened 
the artillery without strengthening the infantry, 6 and raised a general 
prejudice against the use in the field of what was regarded as a complicated 
and useless mechanism. 7 This feeling tended to retard the progress of 
mobility; for its development essentially depended on experience, and an 
arm which was meanly thought of was not likely to be greatly used. 
In a widely different, but in a no less prejudicial way, did the wars of 
position affect the progress of field artillery. 
In the wars of Henri IY. of France there sprung up a system of tactics 
the spirit of which consisted in selecting and fortifying strong positions and 
in awaiting there the attack, which could only be made under great disadvan¬ 
tage. 8 From various causes, which it would be foreign to my subject to 
enumerate, this mode of fighting gained ground as time passed on, cul¬ 
minated in the epoch of Fontenoy, 9 and, finally, only gave way before the 
1 “ In der Schlacht bei Minden waren die Regiments-geschiitze, als die Englisclie und Hanno- 
veriscbe Infanterie vorriickte, wegen der hohlen, ob wokl nicbt selir beschwerlicben Wege, zuriick- 
geblieben und bei dem ersten Angriff der feindlichen Kavallerie befanden sie sicb noch hinter 
der Fronte, wodurch es sich dann ereignete, dass ganze Trupps durch die Intervallen setzten.”— 
“ Ueber Eeitende Artillerie, &c.,” p. 32. 
2 “ Memoirs of Capt. Creichton,” by Dean Swift. Nimmo’s Ed., p. 529. “ Hist, of the Military 
Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan.” London, 1799, Vol. I. p. 368. 
3 “ Essai sur l’usage de 1*Artillerie.” Amsterdam, 1771, p. 7. 
4 “ Ce malheureux sentiment n’est deja que trop repandu.”—“ Reflexions sur la pratique du 
Pointement du Canon.” Amsterdam, 1771, p. 58. A few general and vague directions for the 
handling of battalion guns may be found in Muller’s “ Elements of the Science of War.” London, 
1811, Vol. II. p. 169. 
5 “ Cinquante pieces de 4 ajoutees a 1’artillerie d’un pare . . . feront plus de mal aux 
ennemis et contribueront plus a la reussite des actions de guerre que les 160 attaehees constamment 
aux Bataillons.”—“ Reflexions sur la pratique, &c.,” p. 57. 
6 Notwithstanding the disasters in which the adoption of this system involved the Royal Artillery 
during our Flemish campaigns of 1793-4, some benighted artilleryman, only a few years after¬ 
wards, describes battalion guns as “ a late and admirable invention!”—“ Hist, of the Royal Art.,” 
in the “ British Military Library.” London, 1799, Vol. I. 
7 The Chevalier Folard, in his edition of Polybius, protests against this notion:—“L’Artillerie 
n’est pas un pur mechanisme, comme on le pretend, et il importe aux Generaux d’avoir au moins 
une idee de cette partie de la guerre.” 
8 Fave, “Hist, et Tact, des Trois Armes,” p. 64. Jomini, “Precis de 1’art de la guerre,” p. 135. 
American Trans. 
9 The battle of Fontenoy is the finest illustration I know of the old tactics. Marshal Saxe’s 
dispositions were a masterpiece of tactical skill, according to the old method, 
