200 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
other corps hastening np from the rear, Bazaine 5 s army must stop, 
must go hack, and must be shut up in Metz. 
I heard also, that in the cavalry attack next on the left of this, a 
regiment of cuirassiers with one of lancers rode down two formed 
squares of French infantry; but I had uot the good fortune to con¬ 
verse with any of the officers actually concerned. 
It may be remarked, with regard to the first of these affairs, that 
the multiplicity of the hostile lines certainly facilitated the cavalry 
exploit; and with regard to the second, that squares hardly appear to 
be the most effective formation nowadays for resisting cavalry $ and, 
as to the success, generally, of the attacks by the German cavalry in 
this war, that the latter universally accuse the French of firing too 
high when the assailant begins to close rapidly: it is noticeable 
that the charge so gallantly delivered at Sedan by the French cavalry 
upon Prussian infantry utterly failed i and against fire like that of 
the English infantry, the experiment remains a very questionable 
one for any cavalry to essay. 
The opposite idea of the use of cavalry, as mounted rifles, or real 
dragoons, is not very popular in the German army, owing to the 
supposed difficulty of training short-service men to the double 
action. A Prussian major of lancers, who had served in the Russian 
dragoons in Asia Minor during the Crimean war, stated that the 
system had the best chance with the Russian 26 years 5 term of 
service ; but that even there, the men, being first made good cavalry, 
could never be got beyond the most helpless condition as infantry. 
This may be true of Russians ; but the Prussian hussars are trained 
to act, and have done good service in the present war, both mounted 
and dismounted. 
In infantry tactics they have less novelty: they incline 
to the opinion that good infantry with fair space for the 
play of its weapons can hardly be successfully attacked by infantry, 
without combinations; and that, if the assailed have a breastwork, 
something more than direct artillery fire is needed to help the 
attack home to it. 
But the German infantry advance is very steady and slow; meant 
to be quick at the finish, but it may happen that none of them reach 
it: they blame the French for the opposite extreme, of running up 
from such a distance as to be quite exhausted on arriving at the 
decisive ground. And it must be remembered that their usual front 
line of battle is simply a very strong line of skirmishers, supported 
by battalion columns of companies, all with a strong idea towards 
using the bayonet, which they invariably carry fixed. Perhaps 
when they are armed with improved muskets they will adopt an 
order more powerful in, and less vulnerable to, musketry fire, will 
carry the bayonet in its scabbard, and get rid of the short sword so 
many of them carry in addition. They carry large loads now, and 
march very lastingly. 
In field artillery the main idea seems to be to move 
quickly and fire accurately, concentrating the fire if pos- 
Infantry. 
Artillery. 
