THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
24] 
this, they had to take only the first case which suggested itself—the position 
of an officer in command of troops about to engage the enemy. It was a 
most difficult matter, without information, for an officer so placed to ascer¬ 
tain the strength of the force opposed to him, and upon the extent of his 
knowledge in that respect it was clear that his tactics must depend. It 
would be easy to quote more than one incident from the war of 1866 in 
which an Austrian officer in command had been led into the use of improper 
tactics by inferring that the number of the enemy was larger than it really 
was, because he was opposed to a better weapon, and possibly to better troops. 
If, however, they could not teach tactics by rule, Yon Yerdy had added, 
they could lay down certain leading principles which the military mind could 
acquire and apply in practice, according to circumstances. As, for instance, 
iri that same war of 1866, at Sadowa, a General of Division (Fransecky) in 
the Prussian First Army, seeing the exact position of affairs, felt bound to 
occupy the enemy at whatever loss to his own division; and, on the other 
hand, another General of Division in the same service had not long before 
to do just the contrary—namely, to spread out his men as much as possible, 
and show a large front, so as to draw upon him the attention of the enemy, 
while, at the same time, he suffered no more loss than he could not possibly 
avoid. So, whatever principles were laid down for their instruction in this 
part of the Art of War, they must vary in application according to different 
circumstances. 
Passing now directly to the subject of his lecture, Colonel Chesney said 
he had been long in the habit of treating such subjects not theoretically, 
but historically; or rather, instead of following the whole course of history, 
he preferred to take one or two cases and discuss them minutely in all 
their details as affecting the question in hand, and that was the course 
he proposed to pursue in illustrating the Reform of Prussian Tactics.” 
He thought that any sound writer would lay down what Yon Yerdy 
has, as the chief great principles in moving great bodies of men, the 
two following:—first, clearness in what one sees; and secondly, energy 
in the conduct of the business. Neither of these could certainly be 
taught by rule, but the example of what others had done, and the 
experience of other men in certain circumstances must, if carefully studied, 
be of advantage to the soldier. In practice, one special condition must 
always be considered. If an officer commanding a division was acting as 
part of a corps, and receiving his orders from the General in command, 
he would have little independence or discretion ; but if, on the other hand, 
he were acting independently with his division, the whole course of his 
tactics, under apparently precisely similar circumstances, might be very 
different. 
They would now go back to the early history of their subject—the reform 
of Prussian tactics. The later school of Frederic had often been com¬ 
mented on rather harshly ; but it was not so contemptible as was generally 
supposed. The extremes to which drilling and dressing were carried were a 
necessary consequence of the exercises then in vogue, and especially of the 
system of marching in what is now termed “ open column of companies,” 
absolute precision in distance being essential to bring the troops into line 
immediately at the word, and so find them ready for action. It was true 
that in Prussia, as well as in other countries which followed her, the system 
was carried to an absurd extent, even to the distance between a man’s 
