THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
243 
fought on apparently loose principles,, but yet with a degree of design which 
was not at first apparent; and his argument was, “ If we take the best of 
the Erench system and apply it to the best of our own, we shall infallibly 
beat the Erench whenever we meet them.” That advice, “How to beat 
the Erench,” as it was popularly called (though that was not the real title 
of the lecture), was put into practice for the instruction of the Prussian 
ofiicers in tactics in 1861. In principle, the “Tactical Instructions” was 
essentially different from any drill-book hitherto published. The Erench, as 
late as four years ago, hacl a secret guide book in use among their staff, 
something similar in intention, but in execution totally different, and of an 
effete, antiquated type, as Colonel Chesney could assert from personal know¬ 
ledge of it. Putting aside the minute details of drill in the field, instead 
of attempting to tell a man exactly what he was to do under all conceivable 
circumstances, the new Prussian tactics assumed that an officer in command 
of any force was possessed of certain intelligence, and gave him considerable 
latitude. He was taught to study and to reason, and to work out the result 
of his knowledge and his theories in practice. At the same time the drills, 
especially of the infantry, were modified, and made more elastic by breaking 
up the large and unwieldly battalions into four companies each, allowing the 
troops to work more independently, to manoeuvre at times out of step, and 
the like. The increased elasticity was great, and the Prussians had made an 
improvement from which they saw no necessity to go back. 
The new tactics were brought into practice with vast success in the 
Austrian campaign, but that was too short and too one-sided to afford a test 
of their efficiency. However, the Prussians made two remarkable failures, 
both on one day, the 27th of June, and in one case were fairly beaten by 
equal numbers of the Austrians. The other case was that of Langensalza; 
and in enquiring the cause of that failure they would find that the Hano¬ 
verians occupied three villages with three of their four brigades, having one 
in reserve behind a river running below a steep hill. * In front, the Prussians 
approached to fight in their favourite company columns, and it was found 
that each officer naturally tried to get a good ground for himself. Thus, though 
they approached in regular order of battle, the main body and the reserve 
advancing together at the usual interval, it happened that when they came in 
contact with the enemy, and were in that fidgety state which men always 
were in under fire, the companies took up ground to right and left as they 
could, the reserve had dissipated itself, and the whole at last formed a 
complete line of single companies. The Hanoverians thereupon massed 
their troops, made a direct charge upon the centre, and in a few minutes 
the line was cut in two and the Prussians in full retreat. It was more 
difficult to understand how they lost the second battle of that day—the 
battle of Trautenau. The Prussian General, Bonin, was approaching Trau- 
tenau in two columns, with 30,000 men, expecting to meet the Austrians in 
the neighbourhood; and the Austrian General, Gablenz, with a similar corps 
cV'armee, was coming to meet him in the other direction. The breaking of a 
bridge delayed the first of the Prussian columns, and the second waited 
some time for it to come up. The Austrians meanwhile pushed on to 
Trautenau, and the Prussians came forward to meet and drive them back 
with their first division. A portion of the other division was advancing to 
the south, and the commanding officer, seeing that the country was more 
open, advanced his force of eight battalions unsupported in a thin line in 
