royal artillery institution. 
245 
to condemn columns altogether. He had thought it was impossible (writing 
last year) to bring troops into action in that form in the face of the breech¬ 
loader ; neither did he approve of the line formation, because no line could 
be effective without volleys, and volleys could not be expected now. What 
he proposed was, to open the ordinary line so as to allow two paces between 
man and man. Applying this to practice, he said that skirmishers were not 
effective enough for a charge, but he would have them approach to within 
350 paces of the enemy and open fire; the leading company would throw 
out skirmishers, and he would have no supports, but at 100 paces behind 
he would have two companies in open column, and a fourth at 200 paces 
behind in close column. Opposed to this was the plan of Yon Moltke, 
which would probably have been ere this adopted but for the breaking out 
of the war with France. Yon Moltke proposed to throw out a line of 
skirmishers from the two leading companies, with two-thirds of each com¬ 
pany in support, the remainder of the battalion forming double column 
400 paces behind. The lecturer explained this part of his subject in detail 
by reference to the diagrams, and expressed his own opinion that, theoreti¬ 
cally, reason was on the side of Yon Moltke; but Colonel Bronsart's strong 
point was that the open order system would not work, for the open order 
line must (admittedly by the proposer's own words) close upon the centre 
in charging, just as skirmishers would have to do if used to charge under 
fire, and this attempt to close would be fatal. In fact, he showed that the 
plan had been tried in Prussia many years before, and that, as the closing 
on the centre would be disastrous to the forward movement, the principle 
had been condemned as utterly impracticable. 
The Prussians made the behaviour of officers and men in action and on 
the march the subjects of careful study, and the lecturer cited Yon Yerdy's 
“ Conduct of Troops ” as a remarkable example of the careful study of staff 
duties. Yon Yerdy took as his particular subject the march leading to that 
disaster of Trautenau of which they had been speaking; and his most im¬ 
portant point was, that subordinate officers in command of any body of 
troops should invariably be informed, as far as it could affect their own 
action, of what the enemy was doing, and also of what was in the mind of 
their own commanding officer. This was so much like the advice given by 
the Archduke Albert on the same subject, that they might have supposed 
Yon Yerdy borrowed the idea, but that we knew Yon Yerdy's suggestion 
was published in a lecture privately first; and the only conclusion they could 
come to was, that two able men, in pursuing the same subject about the 
same time, had arrived at similar conclusions. 
The lecturer went on to say that there was as yet great difficulty in reviewing 
the tactics of the present war, owing to the impracticability of obtaining 
precise information; but there were, nevertheless, certain facts on which 
they might found certain deductions. At the first important engagement of 
the campaign—the battle of Woerth—they knew that columns were formed 
by brigades, probably nearly contiguous battalion columns; at all events 
there was good evidence that the Prussians did charge in large, heavy 
columns, and so carried their point. In some of the late actions it had 
been said that all that had been done Avas done by company columns; but 
at all the larger actions, and in a most important degree at Porbach, the 
companies were supported and fed from reserves behind. Porbach, indeed, 
was won mainly by company columns charging up a hill so steep that the 
