24 6 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OP 
men could not fire tlieir muskets. At the more recent affair of the 30th of 
October, the infantry and artillery were combined by the Prussians with great 
effect. The plan was, to take the railway station and village of Le Bourget; 
and the General in command, although by no means a specially distinguished 
officer, afforded a remarkable instance of an officer's carefully preparing his 
tactics. He divided his force into three columns, one advancing direct for 
the scene of action, another to occupy some houses on the right, and the 
third advancing by a different road on the left upon the little village of Drancey, 
and making for the railway station behind the village, to cut off the Prench 
in that direction from Paris. In making this detail the commanding officer 
also divided his batteries between the columns. The lecturer proceeded to 
describe the successful attack upon Le Bourget and Drancey, which he said 
had been ably delineated by a correspondent of the “ Daily News/' from 
information gleaned from a Prussian officer, and which information Colonel 
Chesney said he had found, by comparison with other sources, was very 
correct. The admirable tactics displayed on the 30th of October he had 
quoted especially, because they were the work of an ordinary Prussian 
officer, no more eminent or able, perhaps, than other officers occupying 
similar positions in the same service, and therefore an illustration of the 
valuable training those officers received. The lecturer further showed, by a 
review of the action in which Garibaldi was repulsed, on the 26th of Nov., 
in his feeble attempt to get into Dijon, how carefully the plans of the 
Prussians, even on a small scale, were laid, and how skillfully they were 
executed. Those who had read the “ Tactical Retrospect" would see how 
the criticisms of the anonymous writer had been fulfilled in this present war. 
It was especially due to the better combination of artillery, cavalry, and 
infantry, that the results of the war had been achieved; and more than one 
prophecy of the “ Tactical Retrospect" had been thereby fulfilled in a 
remarkable manner. As the author of that work had predicted, artillery 
had not been used so much to beat down the artillery of the enemy as to 
weaken the opposing line, so as to prepare the way for the attack of the 
infantry, which would instinctively make for the weak point. In that 
respect the “ Retrospect" had been right, though in others it was clearly 
quite wrong. The author had settled the right use of artillery, and expe* 
rience had so far confirmed his judgment. 
The lecturer said he need not go any further into details to illustrate his 
subject, but he would just say a word in defence of lecturing publicly at 
all on these subjects. It might be said by some that the officers of the 
British army had better not study the higher branches of military science, and 
a knowledge of tactics might possibly never be required of them; but for his 
part he could not help the conviction that their fleet upon “ the silver streak 
of sea'* around them could not be always depended upon for the complete 
protection of the land. It might be that they would have to resort to the 
army for ultimate defence, and if this were in any case so, the British army 
ought not to be behind any other army in any branch of knowledge. It 
ought not to be, if it ever had been, that Brigadiers should be found in 
command of mixed bodies of troops with the most trifling knowledge of 
artillery and cavalry, and utterly unacquainted with their uses in combination 
with infantry. It ought not to be that they should wait to learn these 
things until the enemy came upon them. Indeed, to completely avert 
invasion, England should be prepared, if necessary, to fight her battles 
