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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
to heart, and make the army as perfect as possible. It was the duty of 
every officer personally to inform himself of every advance made in military 
experience at home or abroad, and by his conversation, his writing, and 
speaking, to make the national requirements thoroughly understood; so as 
to render it impossible for any Government long to delay in placing the 
defences of the country on a sound basis. There was a strong feeling in 
civil life that the officers of the array were opposed to all advancement. 
The military profession was to a certain extent conservative, not caring to be 
the frequent subject of the wonderful nostrums and experiments frequently 
tried and more frequently recommended. It -was always jealous of any 
innovation which was bad, but its conservatism was not opposed to the 
introduction of anything that was good, and likely to be of advantage to the 
service and to the nation. (Applause.) He regretted that there did not 
appear to be a disposition to fully discuss the subject before them, but he 
desired to ask Colonel Chesney a question. In speaking of Le Bourget, the 
lecturer had commended the system adopted of breaking up the artillery 
into three divisions. Would that principle be generally adopted by the 
Prussians on a larger scale ? 
Colonel Chesney replied that at Le Bourget the artillery was divided 
because there -were three separate attacks. In any engagement the arrange¬ 
ment of the attack and the disposition of the artillery must depend upon 
circumstances. 
Major-General Wilmot asked, further, if there was not some advantage 
on the Prussian side in their system of keeping the artillery behind the 
infantry. It appeared to him that the French had always been in haste to 
bring up their artillery to the attack, while the Prussians, relying on their 
long range, kept their artillery more in the background. 
Colonel Chesney said the Prussian tactics in regard to artillery certainly 
had the advantage, and posting the guns behind infantry was especially 
serviceable when fighting on a hill. In connection with this subject he 
invited the attention of officers to the question of percussion shells, in rela¬ 
tion to which they had gained remarkable experience out of the present war. 
Thus, at Gravelotte, where they were firing up hill, the Prussians wasted 
a considerable proportion of their shells by their flying out of range before 
bursting; whereas at Sedan, which was fought in a hollow, every shot told. 
In answer to Colonel Wright, Colonel Chesney gave some further 
explanations of his diagram illustrating the propositions laid down in the 
“ Tactical Retrospect.” 
Colonel Domville said he thought it should be noted that in the Prussian 
army the company consisted of 250 men, and the large and unwieldly 
battalions in which they formerly manoeuvred having been broken up into 
half battalions of four companies each, it would become a question whether 
we, in the British service, had not in our present battalions of ten small 
companies each, a force in point of numbers about equal to the Prussian 
half battalion; one that would be found equally flexible, whilst at the same 
time it would retain that cohesion which, enabling the whole body to act 
in concert under one commander, would render a defeat from similar 
causes to those that caused the Prussian reverse at Langensajza to be im¬ 
possible. He thought the. principle of throwing out a line of skirmishers 
from the leading companies, with supports formed from two-thirds of each 
of the remaining companies, was one which would never work as well as the 
