MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 0£ 
the shot and smothered the shell." 1 If, in the third place, the enemy 
occupies hard ground, solid shot and blind shell will break up on the 
first graze, or rebound to such heights as to render their ricochet of no 
value. Fourthly, if the inclination of the height on which the guns are 
posted, BAC (Fig. 3), greatly exceeds the extreme depression that can 
be given to field guns, DBF -—about 5° in the British service—the 
Fig. 3. 
JL__D 
enemy can form in perfect security for an attack on the guns, at the 
base of the height G. This happened to the Russian artillery at 
Kunersdorf, 1759, 2 and, by an accident that could not have been fore¬ 
seen, to our own guns at Waterloo. “ The enemy rushed down the hill" 
(having been driven back by the fire of the English infantry and artillery) 
“ forming again under its shelter, and in a great measure covered from 
the fire of our guns, which by recoiling had retired so as to lose their 
original and just position. But in a deep stiff soil, the fatigue of the 
horse artillerymen was great, and their best exertions were unable to 
move the guns again to the crest without horses; to employ horses was 
to ensure the loss of the animals.'' 3 Fifthly, a battery posted as in 
Fig. 3 may happen to form a target for a number of the enemy's guns. 
Solely from this cause, Senarmont was forced to order a battery which 
he had at first placed on a hillock into lower ground, at the beginning of 
the battle of Eylau. 4 Sixthly, the ineffective fire of the guns, enfeebled 
by these. causes, will raise the courage of an advancing enemy and will 
proportionally depress the spirits of our own men; and seventhly, the 
ammunition, which.is worth its weight in gold, is uselessly frittered 
away. 
The most obvious lesson to be learned from the campaigns of 1866 
and 1870 is, that it is not alone desirable but necessary to cover the 
guns and horses of a battery from the enemy's fire, either by field 
entrenchments or by the accidents of the ground; for it is only when 
so covered that the battery can be ensured against destruction from the 
enemy's infantry and artillery fire, and that the men can preserve that 
sang froid which is essential for carrying on an effective fire. 
1 Napier’s “ Peninsular War,” Vol. IV. p. 385. 
2 De Ternay’s “ Traite de Tactique,” Tom. I. 
3 Frazer’s “Letters during the Peninsular and Waterloo Compaigns,” p. 588. 
4 “Memoires sur 1c Gen. Senarmont,” pp. 26, 27. 
