THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
337 
advantages that arise from their invention will be almost neutralised 
by the ills their defective organisation will give rise to. 
Rockets have never been largely used in the field since their inven¬ 
tion, and it cannot be said that their success, on the whole, has warranted 
a more extensive use of them; for, like the elephants of the ancients, 
they are occasionally as dangerous to friend as to foe. 
English rockets were successfully used at the battle of Leipsig, at 
the passage of the Adour in 1814, 1 and at the battle of Toulouse ; 2 and 
the failure of Capt. Mercer’s rockets during the retreat on Waterloo 3 
was amply atoned by the success of Major Whinyates’ rockets, under 
Serjeant Dunnett, at Waterloo. 4 They were used, with effect occa¬ 
sionally, during the Italian war of 1848-49, 5 and the Hungarian 
campaign of the same date ; 6 and our troops suffered much annoyance 
at the siege of Delhi from English rockets discharged from the city by 
the natives. The Austrians used them at Solferino, without effect 
according to the French account ; 7 but they seem to be falling gradually 
into disuse, and little is to be heard of them in the campaigns of 1866 
and 1870. They may be used against infantry, but are especially 
useful against mounted troops, as they terrify horses and throw them 
into great disorder. 
5. When to move . 
1 have laid it down that 2500 yds. is the extreme useful range of our 
field guns under ordinary circumstances. In case, therefore, the enemy 
be falling back, it will be necessary to limber-up and advance when 
the enemy’s line has reached that distance from the guns. On the 
other hand, if the enemy be advancing, it should be laid down as a 
rule, to which there is only one exception, that the battery should 
limber and retire when the enemy’s infantry has arrived at a distance 
of 900 yds. from the guns ; for at that range the fire of infantry becomes 
effective, and the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 have proved beyond 
question that artillery cannot live under infantry fire. 8 The enemy’s 
infantry may be looked on as an ironbound coast, bordered by a belt of 
deadly rocks that stretch out 900 yds. from the shore; and to attempt 
to navigate within that fatal line is to court certain destruction. 
The exception I have alluded to is the case of guns occupying a 
1 Napier’s “ Peninsular War,” Vol. VI. p. 91. 
2 Ibid. Vol. VI. p. 64,4. 
3 Mercer’s “ Diai’y of the Waterloo Campaign,” Vol. I. p. 279. 
* Siborne’s “Hist, of the Waterloo Campaign,” Vol. II. p. 105. 
5 “ Military Events in Italy.” Translated by Lord Ellesmere, p. 108. 
6 “Memoirs of the War in Hungary,” by the Baroness von Beck, Vol. I. p. 150. “Histoire 
de Hongrie,” par Balleydier, pp. 52, 54, 94. 
? A French staff officer, describing the effect of the rockets, says:—“Nous avons ete exposes 
au feu d’une batterie de fusees, qui nous a convert de ses saletes.” 
8 I do not lay down dogmatically that 900 yds., to an inch, is the exact effective range of 
infantry at the present time. I am obliged to select some definite distance, and I select 900 yds. 
approximately, as being in all probability the minimum distance at which artillery should fight 
infantry. 
