360 
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF 
The operations near Berlin lasted one week; and we then went 
w T ith the Crown Prince to Pomerania, near Stettin, and saw the 
operations of BC.R.H. the Crown Prince’s corps d’annee—that of 
Pomerania —which lasted one week. 
Twenty thousand men complete in 44 all arms,” and differing very 
little indeed in height or appearance from the guard corps d’armee. 
These movements were carried out in the same way. The troops 
bivouacked in the open fields,; but it was much colder up near the 
Baltic, and there was sufficient rain to make the bivouacs very un¬ 
comfortable. 
On this occasion, the Crown Prince and his adjutant-general were 
the principal umpires. 
The successes of the Prussians in the present war against the 
French have been attributed to various causes. I attribute them to 
four principal causes, viz. (1) better organisation; (2) perfect out¬ 
post duty; (3) the practice of great manoeuvres every year on an 
intelligent and scientific system; and (4) superior application of 
artillery power. 
On the advantages derived from their system of practising large 
manoeuvres — an intelligent system — I am positive, and to it I 
attribute much of their present success in war: for their generals, 
their colonels, their captains, their staff officers, are only practising 
in reality in Prance what they have been practising for years past 
in Prussia! 
In proof of what I say, the Prussian generals now commanding 
and leading their troops in Prance are the very men we saw two 
years ago handling their troops so skilfully in Prussia. 
I would name the Crown Prince (the most popular man in the 
Prussian army), Prince Frederick Charles, Prince Albrecht, General 
Yon Blumenthal, General Yon Alvensleben, the Duke of Treskow, Yon 
Steinmetz, Yon Goeben, Yon Lowenthal, and many others whose 
names are now familiar to the English reader. 
These men have been carefully and intelligently practising war 
every year for several years past, and the result of such training is 
“ magnificent success.” 
I hope I have succeeded in interesting my audience, and drawing 
particular attention to the two subjects I have tried to work out, 
viz. (1) practical, scientific, and intelligent manoeuvring of large 
bodies of troops, and (2) the use and practice of umpires. I hope, 
further, that I may succeed in making an impression, and demon¬ 
strating the necessity of some change in our manner of doing things ; 
as I am myself—a soldier of thirty-two years’ experience—absolutely 
impressed with the necessity of our changing many of our ways to 
meet the requirements of modern war. 
Since the Battle of Waterloo and the Peninsular campaigns, our 
wars, with the exception of the Crimean campaign, have been against 
Chinese, Burmese, Kaffirs, Maories, Affghans, Sikhs, natives of India, 
and Abyssinians ; in fact, against semi-civilised or barbarous nations. 
I need scarcely say that tactics which have been successful in 
such wars would .not succeed against a European army, led by 
highly-trained officers, and using all the appliances of modern science 
