THE 110YAL ABTILLEEY INSTITUTION. 
457 
But to render the invention of horse artillery a signal one, it was necessary 
that some means should be devised of carrying on the gun-carriage or 
limber such a quantity of ammunition as would make the gunners and their 
gun independent, to a certain degree, of the wagons, and would enable them 
to make rapid movements, within certain limits, without the contingency of 
being perplexed and delayed by ammunition carts; for to enable the guns and 
their detachments to move with rapidity unaccompanied by the ammunition, 
would be as glaring an absurdity as to render the guns and ammunition 
capable of rapid movement unaccompanied by their gunners. Field artillery 
consists of three elements—-the gunners, the guns, and the ammunition, and 
I have already defined its mobility to be the capacity of moving, not one or 
two of these elements, but the three combined in one whole, from point to 
point of a battle-field. The want in question was supplied by the invention 
of limber-boxes, shortly after the beginning of the Seven Years’ War. 
Whether Captain von Holtzman of the Prussian artillery stumbled across 
this invention independently, 1 or whether it was suggested to him by the 
small limber-boxes of the French battalion guns, 2 or by the trail ammunition- 
boxes of the Austrian 3-prs., 3 I know not; but certain it is that about 
the beginning of the Seven Years’ War, limber-boxes were known in Germany. 
This invention is the fourth landmark in the history of the mobility of field 
artillery. 
The artillery of the army which Frederick led into Silesia in 1741 consisted 
of 42 pieces—viz., twenty 3-prs., eight 12-prs., four 18-pr. howitzers, and 
ten 5O-pr. mortars. 4 At the very first battle of the war, Molwitz, Frederick 
saw for himself that the fire of his guns was ineffective, and that the guns 
themselves could only be moved from position to position with extreme diffi¬ 
culty. To remedy the first of these evils, he commanded the captains and 
lieutenants of artillery to spare no pains in placing and laying their guns, for 
the efficacy of whose fire lie made them exclusively responsible, 5 and he after¬ 
wards framed rules to protect his artillery officers as much as possible from 
the ignorant, irritating, and mischievous interference of generals and staff 
officers, by whom gunners in all ages have been sorely let and hindered in the 
execution of their duty. 6 To remedy the second evil, the king saw clearly 
that extensive and radical changes were required, and of such pressing 
1 “ Ausser den bereits erwahnten Xammerstucken ist" die hochwichtige Erfindung der Hasten- 
protze von ihm ausgegangen, welcke in der Zeit bis zum siebenyahrigen Kriege diejenigen 
Yeranderungen erlitt.”—Von Troschke, p. 10. 
2 “Ladite piece a la Suedoise sera montee sur son affut et un avant-train; elle sera garnie d’un 
coffre qui contiendra les munitions neeessaires.”—Second Article of an Ordonnance of the French 
king, 20th January, 1757, given in the Emp. Napoleon’s “Etudes, &c.” Tom. IY. p. 95. 
3 Ibid. Tom. IY. p. 100. 
4 Von Troschke, p. 20. 
5 “ The Captains and Lieutenants of Artillery shall point their guns themselves, and not trust 
the duty to the gunners.”—Extract from General Orders issued the day after Molwitz by Frederick 
the Great, in the “ British Military Library.” London, 1801, Yol. II. 
6 “ It likewise happens that the general in command, or some other general, is himself forgetful, 
and orders the guns to open fire too soon, merely to astound his own troops, without considering 
what injurious consequences may result from it. In such a case an artillery officer must certainly 
obey, but he should fire as slowly as possible, and lay the guns with every possible accuracy, in 
order that all his shots may not be thrown away.”—Frederick, in Taubert, “On the use of Field 
Artillery,” p. 78. This order was published some forty years after Molwitz, it is true, but it shows 
the bent of the king’s mind, and the Potsdam Peg illations were probably elaborated from some 
earlier code. 
