THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
497 
Memorandum relative to the employment of Horse and Yield Artillery . 
Memo General officers commanding divisions or detached brigades should 
indicate to the officers commanding artillery under their orders, the 
general object of the movements about to be executed, and these officers should 
give directions to the captains of batteries as to the best mode of co-operating with 
and supporting them. 
Officers commanding batteries should be permitted (under the direction of their 
own commanding officers) to use their own judgment in selecting the best positions 
to enable them to operate with advantage either in covering an attack or retreat, 
conforming of course as much as the nature of the ground will permit with the 
movements of the corps to which they are attached. 
Any special directions received by the officer commanding artillery from the 
general or other officer in command of troops, relative to any change in the disposi¬ 
tion of the batteries during the movements, will of course be promptly carried out. 
No battery ought to be exposed to the risks of infantry fire, unless under 
unavoidable circumstances which occasionally occur in action. 
Aldershot, 17th September, 1871. 
By command, 
C. B. EGEBTON, 
Major-General, 
Deputy Adjutant* General o 
I fancy the memo, was not kindly received in all quarters, yet the 
advantage of it was most apparent; as it not only allowed the commanders 
of batteries to cover the movements of their infantry in an effectual, 
professional, and scientific manner, but it released the infantry com¬ 
manders from having to drag about with them an “ incubus” which they 
could not get rid of, and knew not how to use. 
As I had the honor of serving on the staff of Sir C, Dickson, I had 
the opportunity afforded me of collecting matter for the following few 
remarks, which I hope will interest you, and at the same time give some 
a clearer insight into the execution of the scheme than could have been 
gathered by the daily and desultory reading of the newspapers. Of 
course all the movements and operations of which I propose to make 
mention did not come under my personal observation; but from subse¬ 
quent conversation with officers who were eye-witnesses of those I did 
not see myself, I hope I shall be able to place before you concisely the 
manner in which the plan of the campaign was executed. 
It is generally allowed that the actions of all public men are liable 
and open to fair criticism, and general officers cannot claim exemption 
on this point; but at the same time, the first duty of a soldier, namely 
discipline, forbids anything like offensively hostile criticism, and I 
venture to hope that nothing I shall say may be construed in the 
smallest degree to a want of strict discipline and subordination on my 
part. 
I propose to follow as nearly as possible the daily movements of each 
corps ; and I use the word corps, because each separate force represented 
more nearly in its composition a corps d’armee, although a small one, 
than a division, which does not usually contain portions of all branches 
