THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
503 
upon the 3rd Corps, and either have beaten it off its. junction with the 
2nd Corps or destroyed it altogether; and it would have had yet time, 
under coyer of the broken bridges on the north loop of the canal, to 
have turned round and smashed the 2nd Corps, as Napoleon I. did in 
1814 when protecting his capital. It had the very great advantage of 
acting on interior lines to either of the others, and was in a position to 
fight either, without exposing its line of retreat by the Bagshot or 
Chobham roads to London. However, no such advantage was taken, 
and it remains only to relate the adventures of this day. 
Again the 2nd Corps may be left out of the question, either from 
its marching too late, or the 3rd Corps attacking too soon; the cavalry 
only of the 2nd Corps arrived in time to see the end of the action, but 
not to take part in it, as it become considerably entangled in the 
swamps of Coldingley Moor. 
As soon as eight o'clock—the conclusion of the armistice—struck, 
the horse artillery of the 1st Corps commenced to shell the camp of the 
3rd Corps, which had not then been struck. Stung by this insulting 
demonstration, the skirmishers of the 3rd Corps advanced and drove 
those of the 1st Corps across, not only the railway but the canal, the 
bridges over both of which were blown up; and supported by a fire of 
artillery—principally at Brook wood Railway Station, where it was well 
sheltered in pits improvised with sleepers and railway iron—-the pioneers 
and the engineers commenced making a bridge and repairing the others 
across the canal, but they were compelled to desist until the main body 
of the infantry of the 3rd Corps had been brought up to their assist¬ 
ance, when they were allowed to cross the canal. And now comes a 
question whether it was expedient to attack the right flank of the 
1st Corps; by attacking that flank, as the 3rd Corps did, the 1st 
Corps were not only forced back upon their line of retreat, but were 
driven further away from the flanking movement of the 2nd Corps; 
whereas, had the attack been pushed on the left flank of the 1st Corps, 
it would have thrown its line of battle into the most disastrous possible 
position—namely parallel to, and in prolongation with, or off its line of 
retreat, and still more, would have tended to jam it effectually between 
the attack of the 3rd Corps and the flanking or turning movement of 
the 2nd Corps, 
At any rate, the right of the 1st Corps began to fall back, and 
eventually was compelled to change front in retreat, harassed by the 
rapid advance of a demi-brigade of the 3rd Corps. After some desul¬ 
tory fighting, the 1st Corps took up an intermediate position on 
some rising ground in front of the cultivated lands of Bisley and Lucas 
Green, where it held its own until the cavalry and some infantry of the 
left of the 3rd Corps, ever pushing their success, began to outflank, 
when a general retreat, covered by cavalry was ordered, and entangled 
as it was in the narrow lanes of the village of Bisley, it is probable that 
a large portion of the corps would have been destroyed; however, the 
retreating force took up a very strong position, well garnished with 
artillery, on the New England and Three Barrows Hills, which being 
too strong for an attack in front, and the 2nd Corps not arriving 
in time to operate, if you except a portion of their light cavalry, the 
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