510 
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDTNGS OF 
the constant collisions of troops on the march betoken a want of care, 
both in the selection of the routes to be followed, and the times of 
departure; whilst the absence of all co-operation in the first two days 
of the campaign of the 2nd Corps, showed clearly, how disastrous to an 
army, might and would be the ignorance and the neglect of the primary 
rules of logistics, by the close adherence to which, the Prussians owe in 
a very great measure, their successes in their last campaign in France. 
The mounted portions of the corps were often widely separated from 
one another, and from their forage, and often had to go an unnecessary 
distance for water; while the entire encampments were often needlessly 
extensive, thereby rendering the circulation of orders tedious and em¬ 
barrassing. The campaign also showed the advantage that would be 
derived in having one staff corps instead of three departments—viz., 
Adj ut ant - Genera? s, Quarter-Master-Genera? s, and personal. 
Such maps as were issued were worse than useless; as besides being 
incorrect in the general features of the ground, they were obsolete, as 
far as roads and boundaries were concerned, the face of the country 
having altered so much since the date of their manufacture. 
The cavalry, with few exceptions, clung to the traditionary move¬ 
ments in masses, sometimes under the close fire of infantry, and neglected 
the more important duties of being the eyes of the army: this more 
particularly referred to that belonging to the 3rd Corps, on the first and 
last days of fche campaign. 
The artillery and engineers appeared, if I may be allowed to say so, 
more at home at their work than the other branches, and this was 
remarked to me by more than one foreign officer; the issue of the 
order I read to you at the commencement of the lecture tended mate¬ 
rially to develop our freedom of action, whilst it freed the generals 
from the constant restraint that the presence of artillery seems always 
to exert on their plans, and their mode of execution. 
The infantry of the line marched and went through their work 
cheerfully and well, and if you except an entire disregard for availing 
themselves of cover, and a tendency to open fire at very long range, 
appeared to leave nothing to desire. 
The militia showed their very marked inferiority in training, and 
physique to the line ; though, probably, with an improvement in the 
professional knowledge of their officers, and a severer course of training 
on the part of the men, they might be reasonably looked to to supply 
vacancies in, and indeed be brigaded with, the line. But it is to be 
remembered that the militia at Aldershot could hardly be considered as 
a fair sample of the force. 
Of the yeomanry little can be said, either for quantity or quality. Out 
of the large and much-talked-of body of this force in England, only about 
170 put in an appearance, and these were ill-drilled, unsoldierlike men, 
badly mounted on unbroken, underbred horses, and could not be relied 
on either for moving as a body or for getting about the country. The 
force in the field Was a direct contradiction to the generally received and 
ill-founded notion, that every man in the yeomanry is young, active, 
eleven stone, rides a £200 hunter, and that no country can stop him. 
Of the volunteer infantry, such a very small force ever took part in 
