THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
47 
wings ere they can take flight in epic strains. We can expect but few real 
poets in an age : we must have real soldiers. The great strategical and 
tactical efforts of masters are fully comprehended by but few in any army; 
still fewer are they who can originate them. It does not follow that all 
should not have opportunity given them for proving their abilities. Here 
our simile must cease; for we do not play in war with dead pieces, but with 
living men, who must be fed, and clad, and provided with weapons and 
ammunition, not only at the beginning of a campaign, but all through it. 
There was, this autumn, great difficulty in supplying for one fortnight 
thirty thousand men, from depots in the centre of a space occupied by three 
divisions, close to London, and in time of profound peace. How should we 
have fared if the war had been real, and the divisions moving every day 
farther and farther from the base of operations ? The only way to test the 
supply departments is by actual work, as nearly approaching that of war as 
we can get. If they are not strong enough In transport, or have not experi¬ 
ence enough to feed the troops for a fortnight during the autumn manoeuvres 
without many a mishap, it would be little less than madness to trust them 
under far more difficult circumstances, when the honour of England is in 
their hands. Gallantry may win a fight in spite of many errors, but it will 
not feed men—nay, it is itself partly dependent on bodily nourishment. The 
supply departments are young yet, and have few opportunities for practising 
their work—one of the most elaborate as it is also one of the most necessary 
branches of the art of war. They must have time and experience in supplying 
armies before perfect confidence can be placed in them. 
Besides the two main objects of such manoeuvres—practice of tactics and 
of the supply of an army with provisions—there are many other branches of 
military knowledge included in “ knowing war,” which can only be properly 
learned, or at least proved, in such peace manoeuvres as will best represent 
real work in the field. There are, for instance, the whole of the duties of 
the staff—including that most important one, acquiring and digesting infor¬ 
mation, without which generals can but blunder in the dark. It may be 
admitted that full knowledge of such duties can only be acquired by service 
against an actual enemy in the field; but we may approach very nearly the 
conditions of warfare if we set our minds to it. In the absence of foxes, we 
hunt a drag for practice of hounds, horses, and men; free military manoeuvres 
are the drag-hunting and cub-hunting of war. It is a remarkable fact that 
the undoubted ability and knowledge of the Prussian generals and staff were 
acquired in time of profound peace, and they themselves say that their 
school was the autumn manoeuvres. Unfortunately, we in England can 
hardly hope to approach the conditions which render the Prussian imitation 
of war so close and so instructive. Up to the present moment, it is not 
thought possible to dispense with tents, and place the men in cantonments, 
or bivouac, according to the weather. We cannot place the inhabitants of 
a district under contribution, and we are obliged to avoid the occupation of 
many portions of the territory which should be free for the march of the 
armies. We can, however, do much; and when we look at the intense interest 
in the late manoeuvres manifested throughout the country, and the anxiety 
of certain counties to be the scene of the mimic campaign, we may fairly 
entertain the comfortable hope that the autumn manoeuvres will become 
popular in England, and be regarded almost as a national sport* 
