50 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
work upon; but it was not intended to be of more use than to give some 
public interest to the campaign, by calling one force the enemy of England 
and another the defenders. To soldiers it mattered little how far-fetched the 
idea was—there were two armies, one trying to get to London, the other to 
prevent it. Furthermore, at first it was uncertain whether the resources of 
the supply departments would admit of the formation and active motion of 
a third division ; indeed the question of supply had to be put, from beginning 
to end, above all strategical maxims. It was quite unfair to criticise, as 
some persons did, the supposed strategical position. Tactics and feeding the 
troops were enough for the first year, and criticisms based on any other 
supposition are quite beside the mark. 
-x- -x- -x- * ■x- * -j- 
It has been said by more than one great military writer that there is no 
such thing as the tactics of one arm. Admitting this, to a certain extent, 
there are yet some peculiarities of movement, whether acting in combination 
with other troops or not, which may fairly be called the tactics of a special 
arm. Eegarding the movements from this point of view, let us think for a 
moment about the infantry—that most important and cheapest of the three 
arms—the only one which can go everywhere, and fight both stationary and in 
movement. Such at least is the supposed advantage of infantry over the other 
arms. But now come two most important questions:—Is the British line 
adapted to modern requirements ? and if not, how should it be modified ? 
There never was any hope of fairly raising these questions until the establish¬ 
ment of autumn manoeuvres set all soldiers thinking about such things. 
Against the stiff British line may be set the opinions of such men as 
Colonel Hamley, Colonel Chesney, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, together with 
the whole body of continental officers. I am not aware of any officer of 
note who has undertaken to defend its suitability for modern warfare. It 
served Wellington's purpose; but in those days 200 yds. was a rather long 
range for infantry fire, and artillery could approach within the practical 
range of case, so that infantry in attacking had very limited distances to 
move over. Even then, it is remarkable that almost all Wellington's great 
victories were fought on the defensive, and consisted in the steady repulse 
of one attack after another till the enemy was exhausted. Let us turn back 
our minds to the days when, light and agile youths, we “ did battalion drill" 
at the E.M. Academy. What anxiety we had when the last advance in 
line was ordered. How we hoped—prayed almost—that no unlucky pebble 
might come in the way, and cause us to be the human instrument of sending 
that inevitable shudder, wriggle, and break in the line which used to drive 
serjeants and officers to despair. With much training, we arrived at the 
possibility of “ advancing in line," if the roller had done its work well; 
but oh, the frequent and agonising sense of failure! Now that ranges of 
f The lecturer here gave a rapid viva voce sketch of the manoeuvres, which is omitted, because 
a fuller account by Captain Wolfe, R.A., has already appeared in the “Proceedings.” (Vide 
Vol. VII. p. 496). In the course of his account, the lecturer mentioned incidentally that on the 
16th, Staveley’s division, though unsuccessful, was allowed to push on to Pirbright, because his 
supplies were to meet him there. No fault was found or suggested on this account. 
