THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
51 
small-arms are so much longer, and troops must advance over longer spaces, 
it is hardly too much to say that British infantry tactics must be almost 
confined to standing still or breaking through their habit of line formation. 
They must form some sort of column to advance, with power of rapid 
deployment. If it be granted—and all military writers now insist upon it 
as an axiom—that mobility is one of the chief requisites for success, the 
only question is how to gain such mobility. You all know that the Prussian 
battalion consists of a thousand men, divided into four companies, each 
company commanded by a mounted officer and formed into two divisions; 
that their fighting order is, speaking roughly, in column of these divisions at 
deploying intervals; that there are three ranks instead of our two, and that 
the third rank consists of skirmishers, who either swarm in front, or fill up 
the intervals, or form third divisions in rear at the moment of attack, as the 
necessity of the case may direct; so that the front of each column is only 
about forty files. Thus line can be formed almost instantly, to resist an 
attack, and, when in motion, the heads of columns can easily move with 
steadiness, conforming to the features of the ground. But, as I have already 
mentioned, during the latter part of the war, when the power of the chassepot 
had become known, the Prussian infantry worked in swarms, gathering in 
groups large or small wherever cover could be obtained, and pushing home 
a charge when an opportunity presented itself. On the 18th August, before 
this system was developed, the Prussian Guards attacked St. Privat in 
columns of such depth that there were on the whole front ten men to one 
pace of frontage. Nearly 6000 men fell in ten minutes, and the attack had 
to be discontinued till the Prench flank had been turned. The Austrians 
now fight, by regulation, in swarms at their manoeuvres, and I am strongly 
of opinion that we must come to something of the same kind. 
Every officer I spoke to, English or foreign, who knew war, remarked 
that the infantry at the manoeuvres almost always gave ground too soon, 
instead of holding it to the last possible moment. May it not be believed 
that the officers in command knew the unwieldiness of the force they com¬ 
manded, and were obliged to retire while they could do so in a leisurely 
manner ? The error seemed to be that it was thought necessary to stand 
erect in line whenever the enemy approached closely; and this, if persisted 
in, was of course as wrong as yielding ground too early. 
Perhaps it was for the same reason that the infantry clung closely to the 
batteries, and persisted in retiring whenever the guns did; forgetting that 
each arm should support the other, and that it is exactly when the guns 
are in motion that the infantry should hold its ground with the utmost 
tenacity. The Prussian officer whose opinion we value most was greatly 
struck by this, and seemed to consider the practice of yielding ground too 
easily so fatal, that the manoeuvres would do more harm than good if it were 
persisted in. A kindred error, if it be so, was pointed out by one of the 
most famous of our visitors—the w r ant of energy in ^attack. His words, as 
nearly as I can recollect them, were:—“ The infantry should always keep 
pushing on. Some detachment, bolder or more fortunate than the rest, will 
get in somewhere; then the enemy becomes confused, and the rest of the 
line can advance.” This is really the great secret of the Prussian infantry 
tactics, w r ith their free column movements : isolated attacks, well supported, 
with confidence that each commander knows how to assist the rest, 
