58 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
of the provisions consumed by the army is drawn from the surrounding French 
territory. That is the business of the Intendant officers, both of the corps them¬ 
selves and of the Etappen Department all along the line. 
“ With respect to reinforcements coming up along the Etappen railways and roads, 
the machine works perfectly. The officer at a station hears by telegraph that he is 
to expect 500 men, we will say, at a certain hour, when they are to dine or sleep 
and be forwarded. He provides dinners or billets for them, as the case may be, 
and when he has performed his part, sends them forward. But, once off the great 
roads, supply becomes more difficult, and corps on the march or actually fighting 
cannot always be fed with certainty. What remains to be done, over and above 
the Prussian system, is to make each man carry his own depot of food sufficient 
for three or four days at least, in a form not liable to damage. This small store 
should not be used except in case of necessity, and should be made as completely a 
part of the soldier’s equipment as his ammunition now is. An army always carrying 
provisions for six days would be movable to a degree not even yet attained, and 
it seems to me very extraordinary that soldiers are obliged to carry extra boots and 
clothes, books even (every German soldier carries a hymn-book), and yet be 
dependent on his provision columns for food. Certainly, the present system has 
one advantage— : the men are held bound to their battalions by the knowledge that 
if they once fall out of the general harmony they are extremely likely to starve. 55 
Here is the system of a successful army, and the details of it are practised 
at the autumn manoeuvres in North Germany. It is based upon the principle 
that the fighting divisions have enough to do to fight, and that it is a 
mistake to spread out the army along a line of communications, as we did in 
Abyssinia, so that the further the army enters into an enemy 5 s country the 
smaller it> becomes for fighting purposes. 
It is impossible to test an organisation of this kind in any other way than 
by giving it an advancing army to feed, as may be done at the manoeuvres; 
but the same thing can be practised on a small scale by the movement of 
small bodies of troops during the summer. So unlike is our present system 
to this, that when my battery marched about fourteen miles to camp for 
practice this summer, I was obliged to send back and fetch forage for the 
horses every day. No wonder that the supply during the manoeuvres was 
sometimes unsatisfactory. 
Lessons and Suggestions. 
The manoeuvres being instituted for the purpose of instruction, as well as 
to test our military system, what lessons have we learned ? 
First, we have learned the necessity for, and value of, such manoeuvres* 
Secondly, that they are possible and even popular in England; that the 
military spirit of the country is not dead, but only dormant, waiting the 
moment when our interest shall compel us to w r ar, or some unbearable insult 
shall cause the blood of Englishmen to inflame their brows with mingled 
feelings of rage and shame. 
Thirdly, that the whole' army is somewhat deficient in knowledge of 
minor tactics. Many instances of such defective knowledge might be cited, 
but it is wiser to refrain, since the want is not now denied. 
Fourthly, that we are very backward in organisation of such necessary 
departments as those of intelligence and supply, as well as in arrangements 
for smooth working between the staff and the supply departments. 
