THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 
61 
only being attached to each brigadier-general’s force, which force might be taken 
(from the small number of troops altogether engaged) to represent a division, and 
such battery the divisional artillery; and when the cavalry were called upon to 
act en masse , one battery of horse artillery was attached to the cavalry brigade, but 
at other times kept with the reserve, which consisted of the two remaining batteries 
of field and one other battery of horse artillery. This reserve was held entirely 
at the disposal of the commanding officer of artillery, to be brought to bear on 
any important point that the general officer in command might deem necessary. 
The lecturer mentioned the attack on the entrenchments at the Chobham Ridges 
as an occasion when it would have seemed especially desirable that this reserve 
should be brought into play. He was doubtless correct. Why was it not ? Simply 
that on that morning the attacking force had been deprived of the whole of the 
reserve, and the three batteries composing it handed over to the enemy and placed 
in his entrenchments. Now, to anyone who witnessed the heavy fire of the previous 
day’s operations, the comparative weakness of the artillery fire on an occasion when 
artillery seemed peculiarly and especially needed, was probably remarkable; but as 
these eighteen guns had been taken from one side and added to the other, it must 
be seen that there was no help for it; for, in fact, every available gun was brought 
to bear—the divisional artillery being removed, as it were, from the immediate 
control of the brigadier-generals, and the whole, under the orders of the general in 
command, concentrated on the chief point of attack. And I may remark, when 
speaking of concentration, that whilst the batteries were separated and placed under 
the best cover available, nearly the whole fire was concentrated on the salient 
entrenchment. 
It was said that the batteries moved too often. Such might seem to be the 
case. Now, in actual warfare, if an artillery fire was opened upon troops, its effects 
would at once be felt, and if the bodies under fire should be in consequence removed 
to a greater distance, yet within range of the guns, it would doubtless be an easy 
matter to still make the artillery fire felt, simply by increasing or diminishing the 
elevation of the gun, without moving the battery; but in these peace operations it 
was found almost impossible to persuade the supposed enemy that he was being 
actually annihilated when fired at from a distance of perhaps 2000 yds. or 
upwards. Had it been practicable to have burst a few rounds of shrapnel amongst 
them, the sensation would have been somewhat different. It thus became necessary, 
in order to produce an effect, to keep the guns in more immediate proximity to the 
troops attacked, and thus, consequently, to move as they moved—at any rate, 
much more frequently than was in accordance with the received rules of artillery 
tactics. This difficulty had been obvious on more than one occasion, and more 
peculiarly so when batteries had been placed with much judgment in admirably 
selected positions, where nothing but the muzzles of the guns was visible, and that 
only at the moment of firing. This was the case on the first attack on the Fox 
Hills, when several regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery were drawn 
up in, as they supposed, an entirely sheltered spot, and hidden by thick woods in 
their front—waiting for nearly two hours, until broken down bridges were supposed 
to be repaired before they could cross a railway. The enemy had, during the whole 
of this time, a battery of heavy guns firing at them from a wooded knoll about 
1800yds. distant. Well, why did the general not remove his troops under cover? 
Simply because he did not suppose the fire was directed at them; for he knew that 
the remainder of the force was proceeding by another road to take the position in 
flank, and supposed the fire w r as directed at them. On another occasion, it was 
not until an umpire of high rank had been found, and been urged to go into a 
battery which had been peculiarly well placed behind a railway embankment, and, 
as on the former occasion, entirely hidden, that it was allowed that a certain 
regiment which had been holding its ground firmly was knocked to pieces, and was 
ordered to move away; the umpire only being able to see, when he got into the 
