63 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
battery, that every gun was bearing on the opposing force, which was massed in 
column and in reserve behind a line of skirmishers, and, as before, quite unconscious 
of the artillery fire. These are doubtless contre-temps which must occur in mimic 
warfare, and more especially in a wooded, enclosed, and hilly country like that 
around Aldershot. 
There could be no doubt of the great value of these autumn manoeuvres. Officers 
of all ranks had learnt much from them; but still the lessons were not lessons such 
as were to be learnt in actual warfare. Much must be taken for granted; and in 
order to play the game with success, it was necessary that precise rules should be 
laid down for the observance, not only of the troops engaged, but equally sp for 
the guidance of the umpire staff, who were appointed to judge of the value of the 
movements, and who were to decide whether assailants or defenders had got the 
best of an encounter. 
Colonel Milward, ft. A., said he agreed entirely with the remarks made by 
Captain Brackenbury as to the necessity in future warfare of retaining a very large 
proportion of the artillery in reserve, available for concentration on any particular 
point, and more readily at the disposition of the general commanding than if 
distributed among brigades. The fact of the batteries being thus held in reserve, 
however, necessitates extreme mobility to make them thoroughly available; as they 
will be required frequently to move rapidly for long distances, to meet sudden 
emergencies. Tor such purposes horse artillery is the most suitable, and there is 
no doubt that batteries of that arm will be largely required for the reserves. It 
therefore appeared to him that every effort should be made to attain great mobility 
for batteries of field artillery, and the question is worth serious consideration 
whether the proportion of horse to field batteries in the British service is nearly 
sufficient. 
Colonel Gordon, C.B., B.A., then remarked:—With reference to the second 
subject suggested for discussion by Captain Brackenbury, he could not help thinking 
the supply department were not so much to blame as it had been supposed. At the 
commencement of the lecture, Captain Brackenbury mentioned that on the 15th, 
after the affair at the Hog’s Back, the supplies of the attacking force were at 
Pirbright, behind the position occupied by the defending force; it was therefore neces¬ 
sary for the latter to fall back in order that the former might obtain their supplies. 
Again, it had been stated in the “ Times ” that on the 14th 3000 men were ordered 
to join the 2nd and 3rd Divisions at Bren sham, and camp equipage and supplies 
were prepared for them there; on the 15th this arrangement was altered, and the 
3000 men were ordered to Chobham, where similar preparations were made. On 
the 16th 1100 men were sent to Chobham, and the remainder were dropped in the 
afternoon at Brookwood Station, as the railway authorities were unable to carry 
them on. At Brookwood no preparations had been made to receive them, and it not 
being possible to convey tents and rations across the heath in the dark, they had to 
lie down in the open, supperless. Another account, in the same paper, stated that 
half a cavalry regiment had been without rations for one day; but it had been since 
ascertained that rations had been furnished to the regiment by the supply depart¬ 
ment, but that half of the regiment having been sent away on outpost duty, they 
did not receive their rations; and he thought this might be some one else’s 
fault but that of the Control. He would suggest that, while no doubt several 
mistakes occurred, all the blame might not be due to the supply department, but 
some should be borne by the Q.-M.-General’s Department *—using the word in the 
largest sense. 
* Colonel Gordon much regrets that the expression above was made use of, as it was mis¬ 
understood. He hoped that it would have been understood by his brother officers as embracing 
all officers on whom devolved the duties of making arrangements for moving troops, either in 
considerable bodies or for small bodies detailed for the day on outpost duty. 
