34 
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF 
the Light Division before the battle of Talavera is a well known case 
in point. I believe I am correct in stating that, during the Indian 
Mutiny, the 60th marched 80 miles in three nights. Probably the most 
rapid march on record of any large body of men, is that performed by 
the French army after the battle of Dresden. On this occasion, 80,000 
men are said to have marched 30 miles a day for three consecutive 
days. But these cases must be regarded as wholly exceptional; as a 
general rule, it may be said that if a column exceed 10 or 12 miles in 
length, its deployment, save under very favourable circumstances, can¬ 
not be effected in less than 12 hours. 
It is scarcely necessary to point out that the excessive length of a 
column of march is, in great measure, due to the artillery. A field 
battery on a war establishment takes up 473 yds. of roadway when in 
column of route; a horse artillery battery takes up 423 yds.; at least 
one-third of these distances would practically have to be added for loss 
of interval. 
“ It should not be forgotten,” says the writer in the Prussian “ Archives,” 
" that every gun which is not brought into action is useless, and extends 
the length of the column unduly.In the case of large 
armies, therefore, it would appear desirable to diminish the proportion 
of artillery to even less than 3 guns per 1000 men, both on account of 
the necessity of being able to move with ease and rapidity, and also 
because it is very improbable that so large a number of guns can ever 
be brought into action/'’ 
How far the truth of this remark is borne out by the events of the 
recent war, it would be premature to state before the incidents of each 
action are more accurately known. In Colonel BorbstaedPs history of 
the late war in France, a small portion only of which has been as yet 
published, the total strength of the French army is given as 460,000 
men and 1344 guns, or very nearly 3 guns per 1000 men; the total 
strength of the army of the North Herman Confederation is given as 
954,500 men and 1680 guns, or about 1*7 guns per 1000 men. In 1866 
the Austrians at Koniggratz brought a very large number of guns into 
action, which did admirable service, especially after the retreat com¬ 
menced. Some Austrian officers are of opinion that the proportion of 
artillery was unduly great, and one goes so far as to state that “ the 
number of guns lost at Koniggratz represented precisely the undue 
excess of artillery in the Austrian army.” The Austrian experiences 
at Koniggratz can scarcely, however, be regarded as conclusive in this 
matter, since Benedek awaited attack in a previously chosen defensive 
position. Under such circumstances the difficulty of bringing a large 
force of artillery into action would, of course, be comparatively small; 
this difficulty will always be experienced to a much greater degree 
when acting offensively.* Since, therefore, the primary object of every 
commander is to assume an offensive attitude rather than one of passive 
defence, it is clear that the standard organisation of an army should be 
such as will meet all the requirements of offensive war* 
* Colonel Stoffel, in his reports on the Prussian army, states that during the campaign of 1866 
a third of the Prussian artillery never came into action* 
